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ABSTRACT
In a fifteen-year period from 1945 to 1960, the Vietnamese Communist Party 
implemented various agrarian policies designed to break the power of the Vietnamese 
traditional village elite, to distribute wealth from the elite to the poor, and to form a 
new class of leaders in order to consolidate power in North Việt Nam.  Over the years, 
many historians have written about these policies, but most have generally 
concentrated on the official Land Reform, which was implemented between 1953 to 
1958, and thus have neglected the significance of the years from 1945 to 1953.  Based 
on new sources and interviews, this thesis examines the Communist Party’s 
ideological assessments, the laws and regulations enforced, and the social and class 
struggles mobilized during the period from 1945 to 1953.  The purpose is to exemplify 
the fundamental importance of the period as the key stepping-stone in the process of 
land reform and consolidating of political dominance in rural North Việt Nam.  
Situated in a weak political and economic position, the Communist Party’s initial land 
policies were conservatively applied to appease the interests and gain the support of 
both the rich and the poor.  However, as the political, economic and military condition 
improved, land policies began to take a critical shift, provoking intensive 
implementation of class struggle necessary to abolish the Vietnamese traditional elite 
and consolidate power. 
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1INTRODUCTION
During the Franco-Vietnam War from 1945 to 1954, the Indochinese 
Communist Party (ICP) attempted to create a multi-level administrative system, aimed 
at strengthening their support among the rural population in the struggle against the 
French, in consolidating power, and in constructing communism.1  However, such 
aims met many obstacles and difficulties, due to the transitions from war to peace, and 
from colonialism to communism.  In the process of these transitions, it implemented 
various agrarian reform policies aimed at breaking the power of the Vietnamese 
traditional village elite, forming a new class of leaders, and redistributing land and 
other forms of wealth to create a new class that had no property.2   
Over the years, there have been many discussions about the implementation 
and effects of these reform policies.  These discussions have typically focused on the 
period from 1953 to 1958, when the Land Reform Proper program (Chính Sách Cải 
Cách Ruộng Đất) was officially put into practice, and later amended.  However, most 
of these discussions have neglected the fundamental significance of the period 
between 1945 and 1953 as a key stepping-stone in the process of land reform and 
consolidation of political supremacy in rural North Việt Nam.  Using recently released 
internal communist party documents, archival documents, Vietnamese newspapers and 
periodicals, memoirs, and interviews, this paper hopes to chronicle the developmental 
steps taken by the ICP between 1945 and 1953 to set the foundation for the 
implementation of the Land Reform Proper campaign in the Democratic Republic of 
                                                
1 Việt Minh, or the League for the Independence of Vietnam, was a communist led collaborative 
nationalist resistance movement against French colonial rule, within which the Indochinese Communist 
Party (ICP)—later the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP), played the dominant role.  From here on, the 
term will be used with the understanding that the Vietnamese communist party played the dominant role 
in all aspects of decision making.  
2 Hoàng Văn Chí, ed.  The New Class in North Việt Nam (Saigon: Công Dân, 1958).
2Việt Nam (DRV).  The years between 1945 and 1953, to a greater extent than the 
traditionally recognized years from 1953 to 1958, was the time when the essential 
basis of the Vietnamese revolution was established, when the DRV implemented its 
socio-economic policies, eradicated the dominant power structure of the former 
regime, and consolidated the political position needed to sustain itself. 
This thesis concentrates primarily on the political opportunism 
(accommodation) of the state-run program and its effects upon village cultural, social, 
and political conditions.  It addresses the ICP’s internal ideological assessments, the 
debates and events that helped to create the land reform campaign, the laws and 
regulations that were enforced, and the social and class struggles that were mobilized 
to garner support.  The policies advanced during the years from 1945 to 1953, 
heretofore de-emphasized or ignored, illuminate critical developments leading to the 
implementation of the Land Reform Proper between 1953 and 1956, and show that the 
progression of land reform in North Việt Nam during this period was instigated from 
the top down.   
This research is presented in four chapters.  The first chapter provides a brief 
introduction to the methodology and sources employed in this work.  This includes a 
review of prior literature on the topic to point out questions that warrant further 
research.  The second and third chapter thoroughly analyzes the much-neglected land 
reform policies during the period from 1945 to 1953.  Chapter two addresses the 
Vietnamese Communist Party’s land policy during the resistance period between 1945 
and 1949.   Chapter three examines the Party’s land policy during the revolutionary 
resistance period from 1950 to 1953.  Chapter four closely examines the process of 
mobilizing the peasants, known as “ba cùng,” literally translated as “three togethers,”
to consider whether land reform grew from the bottom, or was imposed from the top.  
The conclusion assesses the bridging relationship between the developmental land 
3reform policies and their leading up to the full implementation of the official Land 
Reform Proper program.    
4CHAPTER ONE
METHODOLOGY, SOURCES, AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Primary Sources
This thesis is based on archival and library research, in-depth interviews, 
internal party documents, and other materials related to the topic of land reform.  The 
archival research was carried out during a nine-month period from October 2008 to 
July 2009 at the National Archives III in Hà Nội, Việt Nam (Trung tâm Lưu trữ Quốc 
gia III, hereafter abbreviated as TTLTQG3) and the Thái Nguyên Provincial Archive 
(Trung tâm Lưu trữ tỉnh Thái Nguyên).  The TTLTQG3 is the prime source, 
particularly worthy because of its strategic location at the regime's center, and the 
accessibility of documents and information from 1945 to the present.  The Thái 
Nguyên Provincial Archive was chosen as a place of reference because it is located 
where the land reform campaign was first actually implemented. The archival files 
include official and unofficial administrative documents, records, photographs, maps, 
graphs and charts, lists, and other valuable artifacts.  The contents of the files range 
from a single page to several hundreds of pages, and the page numbering within these 
files is often inconsistent.  Files were obtained through being provided with a list of 
items, systematized by a call number and a title, from which requests for access could 
be selected.  None of this catalog information, however, has been entered into a 
computerized database; thus, requests for documents were tedious in that they must 
include the file number and its corresponding title exactly as it appears in the list.  
Even more problematic, documents requested are based solely on the titles, since these 
institutions do not provide synopses of the documents themselves.  It is almost by 
chance if the requested source is later deemed relevant.  The multiple complications of 
this system make it difficult to cite documents using any standard format.  Therefore, 
5to be as consistent as possible with these archives’ filing method, the references in this 
paper include the call number, title, author, intended recipient, place, and date to 
specify exactly which document is under consideration.
Library research was done at the National Library in Hà Nội (Thư viện Quốc 
gia Hà Nội, abbreviated as TVQGHN), Hà Nội Library (Thư viện Hà Nội), and Thái 
Nguyên Provincial Library (Thư viện tĩnh Thái Nguyên), which were chosen for their 
locations and the availability of particular sources for this research.  Sources obtained 
from the libraries include books, magazines, newspapers, periodicals, documents, 
research publications, maps, graphs, and charts.  The majority of the sources used for 
this thesis are books and newspapers.  Newspaper articles are referenced as follows: 
the newspapers’ name, the date published, the article’s title, and page number.  
This research also relied on in-depth interviews and conversations.  The aim 
was to have a more thorough understanding of the Land Reform Program and its 
effects from first-hand interpretations.  In order to do this, a set of questions were 
developed in order to delve into interviewees' experiences of the reform policies, 
paying particular attention to the process of mass mobilization.  Furthermore, these 
questions led to information about the lifestyle and mood at the village level.  
However, the questions tended to concentrate on the interviewees’ experiences during 
the year from 1953 to 1958.  
Interviews and conversations were conducted in the provinces Hà Nội, Hà 
Đông, Thái Nguyên, Thanh Hoá, Thái Bình, Ninh Binh, Bắc Ninh, Hải Dương, and 
Hưng Yên because these places were directly affected by the Land Reform Program.  
Altogether, there were a total of 20 interviews and conversations from these provinces, 
including an equal mixture of male and female informants.  The research was 
conducted according to human safety guidelines.  The informants were chosen on the 
basis of referrals from people who knew them.  The referrers often facilitate the initial 
6introductions in order to help ease the transactions between the informants and 
interviewer.  Informants were fully informed of the research objectives and their roles 
and rights as participants through both verbal and written notification and consent in 
the Vietnamese language.  Only those who agreed to participate after being fully 
informed of the objectives were interviewed.  The interviewer often stayed with the 
informants for an average period of 2 to 3 days in the attempt to establish rapport.  
Due to the high degree of sensitivity of this research topic in Việt Nam, the 
data were recorded entirely by note-taking—during or after the interview—to avoid 
causing unintended risks and discomfort to the informants.  The informant’s identities 
were concealed by the use of pseudonyms, in accord with rules for the protection of 
human subjects.  Interviews and conversations are cited as follows: informant’s 
pseudonym, place of interview, and date of interview.   
Wherever possible, this thesis provides Vietnamese names and words 
following modern Vietnamese orthography.  Translation, particularly of literary 
sources, is always a challenge; thus, poems and proverbs are footnoted with the 
original Vietnamese.  Explanations of the terms used are found in the glossary.  The 
author takes full responsibility for any unintended mistakes in the translation.
Literature Review
Given the logistical difficulties of accessing information from North Việt Nam 
during the war-torn period from 1954 to 1975, and the rigorous prohibitions against 
researching the topic thereafter, there have not been many scholarly works dealing 
specifically and thoroughly with the Land Reform.  What follows is a review of the 
most prominent publications, which exemplify the history of the debate and emphasize 
the need for further in-depth review of the event. 
7One of the earliest and most prominent writings on the topic was Hoàng Văn 
Chí’s 1962 political memoir entitled From Colonialism to Communism: a Case Study 
of North Việt Nam, which describes North Việt Nam from 1940 to 1955, during the 
transition from French colonial rule to communism.  Land Reform was a major topic 
in this work, which has since served as the most influential source for the bloodbath 
theory, used by American policymakers to justify American involvement in Việt 
Nam.3  Foremost, it must be noted that the author of this work considered himself a 
Vietnamese nationalist, who lived through much of the period that he wrote about, 
first as a non-Communist member of the Việt Minh resistance for the nationalist cause 
of abolishing French colonial power from his motherland, then as an unwilling 
participant in the land reform program.  Mistrusting the Việt Minh's leadership and 
policies, Hoàng, along with other Vietnamese, fled from North Việt Nam to South 
Việt Nam in April of 1955 and joined Ngô Đình Diệm’s government.  Displeased with 
the leadership of Ngô Đình Diệm, he requested reassignment to the Vietnamese 
Embassy in New Delhi, India.  It was there that he obtained a grant of US$2,000 from 
the Congress of Cultural Freedom in France to produce his work on Land Reform in 
Việt Nam.4  Given this background, it may be expected that his narration and analysis 
on the Land Reform comes with anecdotes of first-hand experience, but probably also 
with anti-communist sentiment.  
Based on personal first-hand experience, the book was written not as a 
definitive history of the Vietnamese revolution, but rather as a description of the social 
implications of the revolution.  It placed great emphasis on the ideologocial 
developments and the process of implementing land reform.  Hoàng sought to explain 
the process through which the Communists established collectivism in the North Việt 
                                                
3 The theory was based on the idea that a military withdrawal from Việt Nam would result in a 
bloodbath, in which countless Vietnamese would be killed by the North Vietnamese communist regime.  
4 Hoàng Văn Chí,  Duy Văn Sử Quan.  [Humanism].  (USA: Canh Nam Publisher, 1990.)
8Nam countryside.  He was not so much concerned with the economic aspects of 
Communist agricultural policy as he was with the psychological and political aspects, 
arguing that each phase of this policy was an essential step toward the objective of 
liquidating the landowning class and creating a dictatorship over the peasantry.  The 
core of the book is the author’s analysis of four major aspects of the social revolution 
in Việt Nam between 1950 and 1956: first, the new system of taxation introduced in 
1950-51, which was an imitation of the Chinese model; second, the thought-reform 
campaign of 1953-54; third, the various stages of land reform, which wiped out all 
traces of feudalism between 1953-1956; fourth, the ‘rectification of errors,’ which 
followed the excesses of land reform, leading to Việt Nam’s version of the ‘hundred 
flowers’5 and their wilting through the Nhân-Văn Giai-Phẩm dissident affair.6  He paid 
greater attention to the terror, violence, and indiscriminate suffering caused by the 
Việt Minh policies than to the ideological motives underlying them.  In his narration, 
the author relied greatly on two main sources of information: North Vietnamese 
newspapers and periodicals, and his own personal experiences.  Given the author’s 
personal experience and the book’s political subjectivity, the book cannot avoid the 
question of the author’s bias, and possible misrepresentation of facts and information.  
Hence, more investigation is necessary to verify the validity of his account.  
                                                
5 Hundred Flowers Campaign.  08 June 2010. 
<http://www.bookrags.com/wiki/Hundred_Flowers_Campaign>.  The Hundred Flowers Campaign 
refers to a brief interlude in the People’s Republic of China from 1956-1957 during which the Chinese 
Communist Party authorities encouraged a variety of views and solutions to ongoing problems, 
launched under the slogan: “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought contend."  
The campaign was accused of being a political trap, as Mao Zedong allegedly persecuted those who had 
views different from the party. Following the failure of this campaign, an ideological crackdown re-
imposed Maoist orthodoxy in public expression.   
6 Hoàng Văn Chí, Trăm Hoa Đua Nở Trên Đất Bắc [Hundreds Flowers Competing to Bloom in the 
North] (Congress of Cultural Freedom: Saigon, 1959); Tưởng, Năng Tiến.  ‘Từ Nguyễn Hữu Đang đến 
Phạm Hồng Sơn’ [From Nguyen Huu Dang to Pham Hong Son].  September 2003.  01 May 2008.  < 
http://tuongnangtien.wordpress.com/2010/05/14/t%E1%BB%AB-nguy%E1%BB%85n-
h%E1%BB%AFu-dang-d%E1%BA%BFn-ph%E1%BA%A1m-h%E1%BB%93ng-s%C6%A1n/>.
9Bernard B. Fall’s works followed an interpretation similar to that of Hoàng 
Văn Chí, estimating that about 50,000 people were executed durign the campaign.  
This interpretation also helped constitute the bloodbath argument, which the U.S. and 
Saigon governments used as an important propaganda tool against North Việt Nam.  
Like many authors of the period, Fall’s analysis of the program was gravely limited by 
his inability to read Vietnamese, and by his failure to conduct research using original, 
authoritative Vietnamese sources. Subject to the processes of translation and 
summarization, his interpretations of important documents could have been distorted 
by substantial influences from the U.S. or the South Vietnamese governments.7   
Gareth Porter, in his monograph, The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Việt Nam’s 
Land Reform Reconsidered, published in 1972, challenged the notion of mass killings 
in North Viet Nam’s Land Reform by Hoàng Văn Chí, Bernard Fall, and others. In 
contrast to the usual assertions of tens or hundreds of thousands killed, or the exact 
totals of 500,000 executed and 500,000 who died in slave labor claimed by Richard 
Nixon, Gareth Porter argued that those figures were completely unfounded, and that in 
reality, probably only a few hundred people died.8  Porter’s argument, however, was 
written for the purpose of challenging the main rationale offered by U.S. President 
Richard Nixon in 1969 for continuing the Việt Nam War, and thus overreacted against 
the assertions he intended to refute.  He vehemently argued against the notion that 
there could be a communist "bloodbath" in South Việt Nam after the U.S. withdrew its 
forces, without objectively acknowledging such a possibility.  His argument was based 
on insufficient documents or eveidence.  This is especially telling when he continued 
to challenge the bloodbath argument in 1976-77, rejecting early accounts of the mass 
killings by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.  Together with George Hildebrand, he 
                                                
7The Viet-Minh Regime (1954); The Two Vietnams (1963); Viet-Nam Witness, 1953-66 (1966).
8 Porter, Gareth, The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam’s Land Reform Reconsidered (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), p.37-50.
10
wrote a book, Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution, which accepted the Pol Pot 
regime's rationale for the deportation of millions of people from Phnom Penh and 
other cities.9  Thus, his arguments are subject to question.
The most comparative study of the subject during the pre-renovation era 
(1986) was Edwin E. Moise’s 1983 comparative analysis of Land Reform in China 
and North Việt Nam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level.  Taking on the 
task of comparing Chinese land reform with that of North Việt Nam, the author 
viewed the reform in both countries as primarily a political movement, to eliminate 
political competitors and opponents of the revolution.  The book operated on the 
assumption that any authentic social revolution will always involve the mass 
mobilization of the poor, to overthrow the traditional elite in favor of a new and 
presumably more egalitarian order.  Information about Việt Nam was based on very 
limited, yet best available at the time, secondary and newspaper sources.  
Benedict J. T. Kerkvliet and Mark Selden’s 1998 article “Land 
Transformations in China and Việt Nam,” similarly explores land reform and 
collectivization in both China and Việt Nam. 10   Land reform was seen as the 
mechanism that eliminated tenancy and hired labor, equalized land ownership within 
villages, broke the power of the dominant landed classes, and consolidated the 
position of the Communist Party at the village level.  Collectivization transferred the 
control of land from rural households to local authorities, thus increasing the scale of 
cultivation while restricting household production.  The state then, in response to 
starvation in the 1980s, permitted greater economic liberty, by relaxing controls over 
agricultural production, prices, labor, and accumulation by granting households 
                                                
9 Sophal, Ear.  ‘Romanticizing the Khmer Revolution.’
20 Nov. 2007.  <http://www.csua.berkeley.edu/~sophal/romanticize.pdf>.
10 Kerkvliet, J. T. Benedict, Mark Selden, “Land Transformations in China and Vietnam,” in The China 
Journal, 1998 (40).  
11
contractual rights to cultivate small plots of land.  The article explores the driving 
forces behind those transformations.  Its central theme is the tension between the 
central state and local cadres and households with respect to ownership, production, 
and control over land and labor.          
A more contemporary examination of the process is Phạm Quang Minh’s 2004 
article, 11 “Caught in the Middle: Local Cadres in Hải Dương Province,” which 
examines the role of the local Communist Party cadres (members of the People’s 
Councils, People’s Committees, Party cells, land cooperatives, mass organizations, 
and heads of villages), and how the Vietnamese Communist Party leadership dealt 
with problems regarding these cadres in Hải Dương Province during three broad 
periods: land reform in the 1950s; collectivization from the 1950s to the 1980s; and 
de-collectivization from the 1980s onwards.  The author argues that there was a large 
gap between the central government and local cadres in the realization of party policy 
because local cadres faced conflicts with local villagers when trying to carry out 
central policies while also representing their communities.     
In 1986, the Communist government of Việt Nam initiated Đổi Mới 
[renovation], a vague program to reform its economic structure and allow for more 
free-market enterprise. 12    Though not articulating a policy of increased political 
liberty, the Party has nonetheless tacitly permitted more personal freedoms than in the 
past.  Consequently, Đổi Mới created an opportunity for a modest (re)examination of 
the Land Reform Program by both foreign scholars and local intellectuals.  
                                                
11 Phạm Quang Minh, “Caught in the Middle: Local Cadres in Hải Dương Province,” in Beyond Hanoi: 
Local Government in Vietnam, eds. by Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet and David G. Marr.  (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 90-109; Phạm Quang Minh’s other major work on Land 
Reform is entitled Zwischen Theorie und Praxis: Agrarpolitik in Vietnam seit 1945 [Between Theory 
and Practice: Agrarian Politic in Vietnam since 1945].  (Berlin: Logos Berlin, 2003.)
12“Đổi Mới” or Renovation, was, strictly speaking, purely economic reforms initiated by the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam in 1986.  Nonetheless, the Communist government tacitly permitted much greater 
personal freedoms than in the past.
12
Accessibility to party archives was still discouraged; however, the loosening of the 
governmental grip on the northern countryside as a site for ethnographic research has 
created opportunities to gather oral historical data on Land Reform.13  This loosening 
of censorship in Việt Nam, coupled with the emergence of a small overseas 
community of northern political refugees, gave rise to more critical reexaminations 
and representations of the subject in the form of Vietnamese fiction and memoirs.  
Examples include Dương Thu Hương’s Paradise of the Blind [Những thiên đường mù, 
1988], Tạ Duy Anh’s “The Broken Curse” [Bước qua lời nguyền], Lê Minh Khuê’s 
“A Small Tragedy” [Bi kịch nhỏ], Ngô Ngọc Bội’s Nightmare [Ác mộng], Đào 
Thắng’s The Sugar Cane River [Dòng sông mía, 2004], Bùi Tín’s Hồ Chí Minh: 
Memoirs of a North Việt Namese Colonel [Hoa xuyên tuyết], Vũ Thư Hiên’s memoir, 
Darkness in the Daytime [Đêm giữa ban ngày], and Trần Dần’s diary, Notes 1954-
1960 [Ghi 1954-1960], all of which are forbidden inside the country.  The most recent 
is To Hoai’s Three Others [Ba kgười khác], a novel based on the author’s own 
experience as a cadre who helped carry out the reform policies.  Through the novel, 
the author directly revealed the chaotic, divisive, and murderous outcomes of the 
infamous Land Reform.  It had been written fourteen years earlier, but was kept from 
general circulation due to its graphic subject matter and politically ‘incorrect’ point of 
view.  It was finally published in the fall of 2006, and, with its release, spawned a 
riveting forum for the discussion and reexamination of the historical event.
                                                
13 Hy Van Luong, Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925-
1988.  (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; Shaun Malarny, 2002); Malarney, Shuan Kingsley, 
Cultural Ritual and Revolution in Vietnam (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2002); Kenneth A.S. MacLean, 
“The Arts of Disclosure: Peasant-Bureacrats, Hisotriogrpahy, and State Socialism in ViệtNam’ (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Michigan, 2005.)
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CHAPTER TWO
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S LAND POLICY DURING THE 
UNITED FRONT RESISTANCE (1945-1949)
Far from the common narrative that land reform was the Indochinese 
Communist Party’s (Đông Dương Đảng Cộng Sản; ICP)14 ultimate response to the 
desire of the peasants to rid themselves from socio-economic injustices, land reform in 
North Việt Nam was an economic, social, and political reform program implemented 
from the top down, for the purpose of reconstructing Việt Nam’s most fundamental 
level of social organization to consolidate the ICP’s economic and political power.  
Manipulating the socio-political circumstances of the time, the ICP put into practice 
land reform policies that lasted approximately 15 years, from 1945-1960.  These 
policies can be considered in four distinct, successive phases: the resistance period of 
1945 to 1953, the Land Reform Proper of 1953 to 1956, the ‘correction of errors’ 
campaign of 1956 to 1958, and the collectivization of agriculture of 1958 to 1960. 
This thesis addresses the land reform policy developments during the resistance years 
between 1945 and 1953, focusing on the initial steps that led to the restructuring of the 
agrarian regime rural. 
Soon after capturing political control of North Việt Nam in the fall of 1945, the 
ICP established the revolutionary government known as the Democratic Republic of 
Việt Nam, and began rapidly spreading its influence by exerting domestic policies 
throughout regions under its immediate control.  The most urgent domestic dilemma 
facing the ICP was the widespread famine that killed an estimated 400,000 to 2 
                                                
14 From 1930-1945, the communist party that played the dominant role in the nationalist resistance was 
known as the Indochinese Communist Party; from 1945-1951, there was no formal name, but only 
euphemisms like “the Party” (Đảng); from 1951 to 1976, the Việt Nam Wokers’ Party; and from 1976 
onward, the Vietnamese Communist Party.
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million people in 1944-1945.15   Alleviating the famine became the most pressing 
economic objective in 1945, leading to calls for an increase in the level of production.  
Initially, the ICP pushed for the confiscation of lands belonging to French colonialists 
and Vietnamese ‘traitors,’ who were those landowners deemed to have gained their 
wealth and fortune by collaborating with the colonial regime.16  These lands, along 
with confiscated village-owned communal lands (công điền), were nationalized, sold 
(phát mại), and redistributed among the poor and landless peasants.  On September 3, 
1945, Hồ Chí Minh, president of the DRV, issued a decree (sắc lệnh) encouraging the 
population to increase its agricultural production.17  That was followed by a decree on 
October 26, 1945, abolishing the head tax and excise taxes, and reducing the land tax 
by 20%, with a complete tax exemption for flooded areas.  A number of other taxes
were subsequently introduced to finance the DRV government and the resistance 
effort.  On November 20, 1945, a government directive forced all landowners (điền 
chủ) to reduce rents on land by 25%, cancel all secondary rents (tô phụ), and postpone 
all debts owed by tenants since before the August Revolution (Cách Mạng Tháng 
Tám).18  To start taking command of the rural areas and enforcing its regulations, on 
November 22, 1945, the DRV issued decree 63/SL,19 defining steps to establish local 
administrative organizations [Administrative Committee (Ủy Ban Hành Chính), 
People’s Council (Hội Đồng Nhân Dân), and People’s Committee (Ủy Ban Nhân 
                                                
15‘Những nhiệm vụ cấp bách của nhà nước Việt Nam Dân Chủ Cộng Hoà’ [The urgent tasks of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam states].  ĐCSVN, vol. 8, pp. 1-3; There are no exact data regarding 
the number of deaths due to starvation.  Various sources have made estimates as low as 400,000, while 
Hồ Chí Minh estimated 2 million in his declaration of independence from France in 1945. 
16 Trần Phương, ed., Cách mạng ruộng đất ở Việt Nam [The land revolution in Vietnam] (Hà Nội: NXB 
Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1968), p. 167-170.
17 Lâm Quang Huyên, Vấn Đề Ruộng Đất ở Việt Nam [Land issues in Việt Nam] (Hà Nội: NXBKHXH, 
2007), p. 56.
18 Viện Sử Học, Việt Nam: những sự kiện lịch sử (1945-1975) [Việt Nam: historical events (1945-
1975)] (Việt Nam: NXBGD, 2002), p. 19.  
19 The “SL” is the abbreviation denote for “sắc lệnh,” which is “decree” in Vietnamese.  It goes together 
with the regulation number to help differentiate from other forms of administrative regulations such as 
directives, circulars, communiqués, etc.
15
Dân)] throughout the country. 20   These administrative organizations acted as the 
executive arms of the ICP, regulating policies and mediating conflicts between the 
landowners and peasants.  However, restricted by unfavorable military and political 
conditions, during this period the agrarian policies were enforced only in ICP 
controlled areas, especially in the vicinity of Interzone IV (Thanh Hoá and Nghệ An
provinces) and Interzone Việt Bắc (Phú Thọ and Thái Nguyên provinces), the ICP’s 
stronghold in the northern uplands.21  
By June of 1946, according to an ICP resolution, the impoverished rural 
conditions had somewhat improved.  The area of cultivated land had increased by 
130%, making a more equitable distribution of food supplies and allocation of land 
among the peasants possible, thereby reviving production.22  This brought significant 
relief to the peasants, both from the famine itself and from the landowner’s control.  
However, class tensions and dissent also arose from these improvements, due to many 
errors committed by extremist cadres.  Their inability to comprehend social 
differentiation and the class structure often led to unwarranted discrimination, and the 
indictment of intellectuals, capitalists, and wealthy bourgeois as reactionaries.  These 
errors often occurred even when the majority of landowners and rich peasants, 
according to the Party’s assessment, had “sided with the nationalist movement against 
                                                
20Viện Sử Học, Việt Nam: những sự kiện lịch sử (1945-1975) [Việt Nam: historical events (1945-1975)] 
(Việt Nam: NXBGD, 2002), p. 20.
21 For the location of the provinces in relation to the Interzones, please refer to Illustration 2.1 and Table 
2.1 on page 16 and 17.
22 ‘Nghị quyết của toàn kỳ đại biểu khoách đại’ [Resolution by the Annual Extended Delegation], 21-26 
June, 1946.  ĐCSVN, vol. 8, p. 75.
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Illustration 2.1: French Colonial Administrative Map of Việt Nam (pre-1954).
Source: http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~vern/ban_do/colonie.gif
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Table 2.1: North Việt Nam provinces (areas) that belonged to an interzone at the time 
of land reform.
Sources: Trần Phương (1968), Moise (1983), Decree No. 127/SL
Interzone Names of Provinces
Interzone 
I (Việt 
Bắc)
Hà Giang (3), Cao Bằng (4), Tuyên Quang (6), Bắc Kạn (7), Thái
Nguyên (12), Lạng Sơn (8), Vĩnh Phúc (11), Phú Thọ (10), Bắc Ninh 
(16), Hải Ninh (14), Bắc Giang (13, Phủ Lạng Thương in map)
Interzone 
II
Lai Châu (1), Sơn La (9)
Interzone 
III
Ninh Bình (25), Hoà Bình (19), Hưng Yên (20), Hải Dương (21), 
Thái Bình (23), Kiến An (17), Lào Cai (2), Yên Bái (5), Hà Nam
(22), Nam Định (26), Hà Đông and Sơn Tây (15, Hà Tây in map)
Interzone 
IV
Thanh Hoá (24), Nghệ An (27), Hà Tĩnh (28), Quảng Bình (29)
Areas that 
do not 
seem to 
have been 
in any 
interzone
Hà Nội, Hải Phòng
Note:  An Interzone or “liên khu” in Vietnamese, is an administrative grouping of 
several provinces.  Six interzones were established during the resistance war against 
France.  Interzone I (Việt Bắc) was the northeast region of Bắc bộ (Tokin area), and 
contained a substantial population of ethnic minority groups.  During the resistance 
years, the DRV had its headquarters there.  Interzone II, western Bắc-bộ, had very 
large minority populations.  Interzone III, the valley of the Red River, contained most 
of the ethnic Kinh Vietnamese.  Interzone IV was the northern half of Trung-bộ
(Annam area), stretching to just south of Hue.  Interzone V was the southern half of 
Trung bộ.  And Interzone VI was Nam-bộ (Cochinchina area).  In Table 2.1, please 
refer to the number () next to the name of the province to identify the province in 
Illustration 2.1.  
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foreign aggression.”  Many fighters who joined the nationalist resistance against the 
French had rural backgrounds or came from the rural gentry and landowning 
families.23  The cadres nonetheless “followed the tail of the poor and middle [class] 
peasants” and intimidated, arrested, and terrorized them.  Consequently, instead of 
uniting the masses, they caused resentment, discontent and fear, which drove 
landowners and rich peasants to mistrust and be alienated from the revolution, even 
leading to anti-government protests in a few places.24  
The severity of this problem, together with the difficulties of trying to establish 
political control in the midst of the French return to Hà Nội and of its own relocation 
to the mountainous Việt Bắc, inevitably pushed the ICP to set aside its anti-feudal 
objectives until conditions were more favorable.25  Constrained by these developments 
and the need to maximize their support among all social classes to bolster the 
resistance, the ICP launched a campaign to unite the people, and bring them closer to 
the Party.  In a report entitled, “Our Policy,” General Secretary of the Party, Trường 
Chinh accused the French of using divisive tactics to undermine Vietnamese class 
unity.  He called for a national united front (mặt trận thống nhất) to unite all 
Vietnamese regardless of race, class, religion, or political affiliation.  As embodied in 
the slogan “Trung, Nam, Bắc một nhà,” literally “Central, South, North one house,” 
social classes and political groups were urged to set aside their differences, to 
compromise, and to help each other in the interests of creating one united nation.  
Thus, the ICP encouraged landowners and tenants to ‘concede’ to each other’s 
                                                
23 It is important to note that the Việt Minh organization was a coalition of several nationalist groups, 
which many fighters joined for the nationalist cause of liberating Việt Nam from French colonialism, 
and not necessarily to establish a socialist state.  That is why from 1945-1951, the ICP formally 
removed its name from all public mediums, fearing that its communist associations would deter the 
support of other nationalists.  
24 ‘Nghị quyết của toàn kỳ đại biểu khoách đại’ [Resolution by the Annual Extended Delegation], 21-26 
June, 1946.  ĐCSVN, vol. 8, p. 75, 84-5.
25 The anti-feudal objectives were embodied in the slogan ‘land-to-the-tiller’ in the Party’s declaration 
in 1930.
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interest, and to continue cultivating.26  They insisted that tenants and peasants honor 
the landowner’s constitutional rights of private ownership by paying rents and taking 
care of crops.27  This was a temporary strategy, aimed at retaining the support of the 
rich peasants and landowners for the resistance, both because of their political 
influence at the local level, and because they contributed a large amount of the wealth 
needed to sustain the Việt Minh army and government during the early years of the 
resistance.  However, as Trường Chinh also argued, this unifying tactic of ‘internal 
détente to deal with the external’ was necessarily opportunistic, done to achieve 
greater political purposes.  Once the political objectives of winning the resistance and 
gaining the political advantage in Việt Nam were met, the issue of class solidarity 
would no longer be relevant, and thus class struggle would proceed in order to 
consolidate power at the rural level.28
Thus, despite promulgating land policies as early as the summer and autumn of 
1945, these strategies had a very limited practical effect for a number of reasons.  
First, due to a weak political position, the ICP leadership was more preoccupied with 
engaging in other domestic and international events in order to establish political 
legitimacy.  Second, there was a relatively limited area of cultivation under its 
permanent occupation.  Aside from the provinces of Nghệ An and Thanh Hoá, other 
areas under the DRV control, particularly the Việt Bắc region, had very few 
landowners with large amounts of land.  The third, and most important reason, was the 
essential need to gain the cooperation of and maintain the maximum support from both 
the rich and the poor.  The ICP believed that in order to ensure sufficient food 
production to support their war effort, it could not risk disrupting the existing farming 
                                                
26 ‘Chỉ thị của ban chấp hành trung ương về kháng chiến kiến quốc’ [Directive by the Central Executive 
Committee on Resistance and State formation], 22 Nov. 1945.  ĐCSVN, vol. 8, p. 32. 
27 ‘Tuyên ngôn, chương trình của Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh’ [Declaration, program of the League 
for the Independence of Vietnam], 25 Oct. 1941.  QHNCHXHCNVN, vol. 1, p. 3-7.  
28 ‘Chính sách của chúng ta’ [Our Policy], Trường Chinh’s report.  ĐCSVN, vol. 8, p. 434-443.
20
patterns or alienating rural social classes by attempting to radically reshuffle rural 
society.  Also, retreating from the kind of class struggle and land reform that it had 
intended to carry out, the ICP decided not to fully mobilize the peasants against the 
landowners.  For both political and economic reasons, it understood that the 
landowners and rich peasants were useful for their political influence in the rural 
areas, especially in terms of providing the surplus production on which the ICP 
depended.29  Thus, the pace and scope of their land policies from 1945 to 1947 were 
limited to mitigating the peasant’s impoverished conditions, via rent and interest rate 
reductions, progressive taxation and wage controls, and utilizing uncultivated land to 
increase production.  Only land that was communal, or owned by Frenchmen or 
Vietnamese traitors – but not land owned by supporters of the resistance – was 
confiscated and redistributed.  These strategies were “conservatively” employed, to 
appease the interests of the rich and poor, and thereby allot the Việt Minh the 
necessary economic and manpower support needed to consolidate its political position 
throughout the rural areas and to sustain the war.  It also needed time to raise class-
consciousness among the peasantry and to indoctrinate its cadres with the essential 
experience and practical skills required before major land reform could be attempted.30  
In 1948, the Vietnamese nationalist movement took a crucial radical shift, 
which resulted from converging developments during late 1947 and early 1948.  These 
developments included changes in international politics, in French-Vietnamese 
relations, and in the relationship between the communist leadership and its political 
adversaries within the nationalist resistance movement.  The international political 
landscape, three years removed from the end of the Second World War, had begun to 
                                                
29 Andrew Vickerman, The Fate of the Peasantry: Premature “Transition to Socialism” in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), p.45-
46.
30 ‘Nghị quyết của hội nghị cán bộ trung ương’ [Resolution by the Central Committee Conference], 31 
July-1 Aug. 1946.  ĐCSVN, vol. 8, p. 104-5. 
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shape itself into two competing ideological and political blocs.  The ICP sided with the 
communist revolutionary developments led by the Soviet Union and China.31  As a 
result, the resistance in Việt Nam shifted beyond the sole cause of national 
independence toward the goal of building a socialist regime.  As argued at the Fifth 
Cadres’ Conference in 1948, the revolution “can’t not be influenced by the worldwide 
revolution.  To advance forward, it has to search within the global revolutionary 
movement for new alliances and new experiences”32   Domestically, this apparent 
ideological shift led to serious rifts within the nationalist coalition, and marked the 
beginning of the end of the ‘national united front’ period and of cooperation with 
bourgeois nationalists.33  Militarily, the resistance against the French had turned into a 
protracted struggle, as negotiations between the French and ICP leaders failed to reach 
a mutually agreeable solution.34  Demographically, 90% of the population in Việt Nam 
were farmers, and agriculture accounted for the largest and most important factor in 
the economy.  Given such large numbers, mobilizing the peasantry to join the 
resistance movement became a necessity.  To achieve this, the ICP had to fulfill its 
promise of the peasants’ main demand — land.  However, up until 1948, aside from 
the Nghệ An and Thanh Hoá provinces and a few other parts of the mountainous Việt 
Bắc area, the revolutionary government had yet to attract the peasant masses, due the 
relatively limited cultivatable area under its direct occupation, and its of assertiveness 
                                                
31 The Soviet Union had taken a moderate line toward the problems in Vietnam and did not give much 
political support to the Vietnamese resistance until 1948 and 1949.  Only after China had recognized the 
DRV did the Soviet Union do so, in 1950.
32 ‘Chúng ta chiến đấu cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for independence and democracy], report read 
at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 200; World revolution is the 
Marxist concept of overthrowing capitalism in all countries, via organization of the working class.
33 Tường Vũ, “‘It’s time for the Indochinese Revolution to show its true colours’: The Radical turn of 
Vietnamese politics in 1948”, in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (United Kingdom: The National 
Univesity of Singapore, 2009), p. 519-542.
34‘Chúng ta chiến đấu cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for Independence and Democracy], report read 
at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 184.
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in implementing land policies.35  As a result, policies such as the 25% reduction in 
land rent issued in 1945 yielded only a modest increase in economic output, leading to 
a shortage of adequate supplies (food, clothing, and weapons) required to support the 
revolution and to stabilize DRV control over the population.  Such economic 
deficiencies led to the flow of French goods into the DRV domain, disrupting the 
economy and damaging the DRV’s political and military influence.36  
Those effects led to a very significant change in the ICP’s land reform policy 
and its implementation.  Instead of adhering to its 1941 guidelines, which required that 
all energy be focused on resisting imperialism before carrying out land reform, the 
ICP decided to simultaneously carry out both anti-imperialist (phản đế [quốc]) and 
anti-feudalist (phản phong [kiến]) resistance.  It advocated the gradual abolition of the 
landowning class, whom it classified as “exploitative feudal remnants,” to improve the 
livelihood of the peasants, in order to persuade a large proportion of the population to 
become more dedicated to the government and its resistance movement.37  To do so, at 
the Second Plenum of the ICP Central Committee from January 15 to 17, 1948, the 
ICP redefined the main goals of its land policy with 17 objectives.  Overall, the 
statement upheld the land rent measures initiated in the November 20, 1945 directive, 
emphasizing the need for their full implementation in areas where this had yet to be 
done.  It also ordered that property belonging to enemies and traitors be temporarily 
allocated to poor cultivators.38
                                                
35 In reality, the region under DRV control had very few large landowners, and those who did own land 
generally did not have large amounts. 
36 ‘Chỉ thị gửi các khu ủy về việc tịch thu ruộng đất, tài sản của bọn Việt gian phản quốc’ [Directive 
send to Area Commissar Regarding Confiscation of Land and Property Belonging to Traitors and 
Treason] Vol. 9, p. 61; ‘Chỉ thị của trung ương phát động phong trào thi đua ái quốc’ [Directive by the 
Central Committee on Mobilizing the Patriotic Movement], 27 Mar. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 79.
37 ‘Chúng ta chiến đấu cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for Independence and Democracy], report 
read at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 199.
38 ‘Nghị quyết hội nghị trung ương mở rộng’ [The resolution of the expanded Central Committee 
Plenum], 15-17 Jan. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 31-32; Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and 
North Vietnam: consolidating the revolution at the village level (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1983), p.156.
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This general statement of objectives was soon followed by five concrete 
guidelines issued at the Fourth Cadres’ Conference, regarding the usage of land and 
property belonging to Vietnamese traitors and Frenchmen.39  That conference was 
followed by the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from August 8 to 16, 1948, in which the 
Party explicitly defined anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism as the two main goals for 
its new democratic revolution.  Once more, land reform was emphasized as a vital 
necessity toward winning full support for the ongoing nationalist struggle.40  However, 
the ICP also realized that it could not risk disrupting the great unity (đại đoàn kết) by 
simply stripping the landowners, who had supported the independence movement, of 
their lands, and redistributing them to the poor.41  Hence, to balance the fulfillment of 
the promise of land for the peasants with the appeasement of the richer rural classes, 
the ICP advocated collaboration and solidarity with notables (thân sĩ) and intellectuals 
(trí thức) in the landowner and bourgeois classes, believing that these classes “still 
have the ability to resist the French, the ability to revolt.”42  In reality, these abilities 
were the economic and political influence that the landowning class possessed over 
the rural masses.  Regardless of how much the ICP wanted to instigate a class struggle 
by blaming the landowners for all of the peasants’ miseries, it could not deny the fact 
that a relatively respectful and good relationship existed between most landowners and 
peasants.   
                                                
39 Lâm Quang Huyên, Vấn Đề Ruộng Đất ở Việt Nam [Land issues in Việt Nam] (Hà Nội: NXBKHXH, 
2007), p. 58-59.
40 Viện Sử Học, Việt Nam: những sự kiện lịch sử (1945-1975) [Việt Nam: historical events (1945-
1975)] (Việt Nam: NXBGD, 2002), p. 56.
41 “Đại đoàn kết” or the Great Unity, which has its roots in classical Chinese philosophy, refers to a 
utopian vision of the world in which everyone and everything is at peace.  It has been invoked many 
times in modern Chinese history.  In Chinese Marxism, it was associated with the state of world 
communism.
42 Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: consolidating the revolution at the 
village level (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 156; ‘Chúng ta chiến đấu 
cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for Independence and Democracy], report read at the Fifth Cadres’ 
Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 209-210.
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For those reasons, the ICP resorted to fairly modest strategies.  It gradually 
restricted the scope of the landowners’ influence, modifying the land system by means 
of rent and interest rate reductions and cooperative reorganization in the rural areas, 
while at the same time calling for national unity among all social classes.43  As argued 
at the conference, “there is no class struggle among the political parties and classes in 
the united front, but only sincere cooperation; everyone places the national interest 
above all.”44  To promote unity among these political parties and classes, and to avoid 
“making the already skeptical bourgeoisie, landowners, Catholics, become frightened, 
and (prevent) the reactionaries from seizing the opportunity to disrupt the unity,” the 
ICP removed itself from the public sphere, and led the resistance covertly behind the 
united front.45  By means of the Việt Minh front, it established organizations, unions, 
associations, and parties like the Socialist Party and Democratic Party, to integrate 
those groups into the revolution.  In doing so, it was able to bond together the different 
parties and classes, and utilize them for the resistance.46  At the same time, it was also 
able to remove any opposition, while it continued to strengthen and expand its 
political grip throughout the population.47  It argued that only when the world situation 
had absolutely changed in its favor, or when the “resistance is completely successful,” 
should it “rely on new conditions to push the land reform forward.”48
The ICP continued to encourage its officials to explain the necessity of making 
concessions to all rural social classes and convince them to compromise with each 
other, in order to avoid class conflicts that could harm the political interests of the 
                                                
43 Lâm Quang Huyên, Vấn Đề Ruộng Đất ở Việt Nam [Land issues in Việt Nam] (Hà Nội: NXBKHXH, 
2007), p. 60.
44 ‘Chúng ta chiến đấu cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for Independence and Democracy], report 
read at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 213.
45‘Tình hình và nhiệm vụ mới’ [Party’s situation and new tasks].  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 316-317. 
46 ‘Công tác dân vận và công tác mặt trận dân tộc thống nhất’ [People’s mobilization task and the 
National United Front task].  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 260.
47 ‘Tình hình và nhiệm vụ mới’ [Party’s situation and new tasks].  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 276-320.  
48 Ibid., p. 317; ‘Chúng ta chiến đấu cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for Independence and 
Democracy], report read at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 317.    
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nation.  As expressed at the conference, “the working class of Indochina must rely on 
the middle class, poor, and landless peasants uniting with the rich peasants, and 
convince the landowners to resist French imperialists.”49   However, to initiate its 
objective of carrying out rent and interest rate reductions, the ICP leadership also 
began mobilizing the peasantry by investigating rural conditions (điều tra nông thôn).  
On February 18, 1948 the Party’s Central Standing Committee (Ban Thường Vụ
Trung Ương Đảng) issued a directive ordering each party zone committee (khu ủy) to 
enforce the government’s land resolutions, and to confiscate the property and land of 
Vietnamese traitors.  Every committee was required to formulate a list of traitors’ 
names, survey their land and property, and prosecute them.  However, the directive 
stressed that legal action against traitors was meant only to set an example; it should 
not go to extremes that could cause bewilderment among the capitalist and landowner 
classes or fear that it might be the first step toward the eventual confiscation of their 
property and land.  Thus, the indictment of traitors was to be based on concrete 
evidence of treacherous acts; mere opportunists were to be granted clemency, while 
innocent wives and children were to be allowed adequate means to live.50  
On May 19, 1948, in a directive concerning mobilization, the Party Central 
Committee determined that its cadres at the provincial and district level (cấp khu) had 
not thoroughly enforced the government’s prescribed measure of investigating rural 
conditions. 51   Hence, on November 23, 1948, the Party issued two successive 
directives on investigating rural conditions, and provided both survey templates and 
specific instructions on how to investigate, report, and analyze the rural conditions.  
                                                
49 ‘Chúng ta chiến đấu cho độc lập và dân chủ’ [We fight for Independence and Democracy], report 
read at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference from 8-16 Aug. 1948.  ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 223.
50 ‘Chỉ thị gửi các khu uỷ về việc tịch thu ruộng đất, tài sản của bọn Việt gian phản quốc’ [Directive 
sent to area commissars regarding the confiscation of land and property of treasonous traitors].  
ĐCSVN, vol. 9, p. 60-61.  
51 ‘Chỉ thị về vấn đề vận động nông dân’ [Directive on the issue of mobilizing the peasants].  ĐCSVN, 
vol. 9, p. 140-141.
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The survey focused on gathering information on the commune’s overall population, 
and its economic, political, and military situations.  However, the investigation still 
focused on the problems of land distribution and social class.52   The purpose of 
investigating rural conditions was to gather information to help the ICP and its cadre 
to better understand the peasant’s situation, to improve its ability to mobilize the 
peasants and to implement its land policies.53  The relevant reports, assessments, and 
regulations indicate a tremendous level of communication between the ICP leadership 
and its subordinate officials at the local levels, particularly during the campaign to 
investigate rural conditions.  Moreover, it may be argued that, at the very least, by the 
end of 1948 the ICP leadership had begun to amass a much clearer understanding of 
rural North Việt Nam’s political, cultural and economic situation.54
At the Sixth Cadres’ Conference convened on January 14 to 18, 1949, Trường 
Chinh encouraged “thorough implementation of the land reform policy that the Party 
had defined at the Fifth Cadres’ Conference.”  He particularly urged the government 
to exert energy toward mobilizing the peasants to demand rent reduction, especially 
among members of the landowner class who were also comrades, party members, and 
members of resistance cadres, so that they could be used as inspirational examples for 
other landowners. 55   The conference issued a resolution to "speed up the [1948] 
campaign for the investigation of rural conditions to prepare…for a secured land 
reform program" that could be implemented whenever the conditions were suitable.56  
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It continued to promote the enforcement of the 25% rent reduction, the equal 
redistribution of communal land, the increase of production, the establishment of 
cooperative [farming] (hợp tá xã), and the reformation of agriculture to improve the 
people’s lives. 57   In a bid to boost the economy and resolve the problem of 
uncultivated plantations, the ICP issued a decree in February 1949, ordering the 
confiscation of Frenchmen’s and traitors’ lands, and the temporary allocation of those 
lands to the tillers.  Land abandoned by its owners was also temporarily allocated to 
local peasants, until the owners returned to cultivate it themselves.58  These orders 
were meant to be implemented throughout Việt Nam, particularly North Việt Nam; 
however, they were only enforced in areas under permanent or temporary control by 
the DRV, which at this time, was mostly limited to provinces such as Thái Nguyên, 
Bắc Giang and Phú Thọ in Interzone Việt Bắc and Thanh Hoá, Hà Tĩnh and Nghệ An 
in Interzone IV.   
On July 1, 1949, the DRV issued decree 75/SL, dividing up confiscated land 
and property belonging to convicted traitors into three categories, whereby cultivatable 
lands were allocated to the tillers.59  On July 14, 1949, the DRV ratified decree 78/SL, 
replacing the Ministry of Interior’s 1945 circular60 on rent reduction, and again calling 
for the implementation of the 25% land rent reduction and the cancellation of all debts 
and obligations imposed on the peasants before August 19, 1945.  It oversaw the 
establishment of a Committee on Rent Reduction (Ủy ban Địa tô) in every province to 
evaluate complaints on rent reduction, and defined specific administrative authority 
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and responsibility for carrying out the decree.61  This decree was supplemented by an 
order on July 23, 1949, exempting DRV personnel from the rent reduction, if they 
rented out less than three acres (mẫu) of land.62  On October 14, 1949, the Party 
Central Standing Committee issued a directive to enforce decree 78/SL, temporarily 
allocating Frenchmen’s and traitor’s land to poor peasants.  The purpose of this action 
was to make the poor peasants become more supportive of the government.  To 
successfully carry out this policy and achieve its purpose, the Central Committee 
prescribed precise methods for administrative agencies at all levels to inform, explain, 
and promote the government policy.  The Temporary Allocation Council specified the 
time, location, tasks, and objectives for the cadres to follow during the implementation 
process.  Able cadres were organized to mobilize the poor peasant masses, and enforce 
temporary land allocations and cooperative farming in rural areas under the DRV’s 
control. 63   During this process, the Party also promoted the reorganization of 
institutions at the local level.  Their aim was to restructure the local hierarchies and 
influences by removing landowners, rich peasants, and bullies (cường hào, cruel and 
abusive notables/landowners) and replacing them with elements from the poor, 
landless class.  These elements were trained by experienced cadres, with resources 
provided by the Party’s Central Committee.  Once trained, they were appointed to 
influential positions, and provided with the resources and support necessary to develop 
and expand their authority throughout the areas under DRV control.64  
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During the years of resistance against the French between 1945 and 1949, the 
ICP had to temporarily put aside its original policy of “land-to-the-tiller.”  Therefore, 
land policies primarily consisted of rent and interest rate reduction, progressive 
taxation and wage controls, redistribution of lands owned collectively by the village-
commune or belonging to Frenchmen and Vietnamese traitors, and increasing 
production through the utilization of uncultivated land.  These measures helped to 
mobilize the population against the French, but did not lead to a significant attack on 
the rural rich class.  There were a number of reasons, but most fundamentally, the ICP 
realized that the war effort required the strong support of the majority of poor peasants 
but also the cooperation of the landowners and rich peasants, who were essential for 
their economic, political, and social influence at the local level.  Thus, the ICP could 
not disrupt the united front by enforcing major agrarian reform, which would require 
the confiscation of land and wealth from the landowners and rich peasants.  It also 
understood that it lacked sufficient political control over rural areas, sufficient 
numbers of trained and educated cadres, and the required degree of class-
consciousness among the peasantry to carry out major agrarian reforms.  These 
circumstances began to change in late 1949, when policies focused more on 
understanding conditions at the rural level, restructuring the local organizations, and 
training cadres with the necessary experience to lay the groundwork for a major shift 
in agrarian policy beginning in 1950.  
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CHAPTER THREE
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S LAND POLICY DURING THE 
REVOLUTIONARY RESISTANCE (1950-1953)
Up until 1950, the ICP’s land policies were modest, limited to demanding rent 
reduction and to investigating conditions in rural areas.  Their motivation was the need 
to appease all classes in order to gain the support of the masses and maintain a united 
national front in the anti-imperialist struggle.  Although the fundamental line of 
maintaining a broad united front was retained in the period from 1950 to 1953, the 
land program was redefined to become more radical and ‘leftist’ (tả khuynh) because 
of changing international and national conditions.  These shifting conditions included 
the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 in China, which militarily secured 
the DRV’s rear areas and eased the supply problem, and the Soviet Union’s full 
recognition of the DRV and approval of its national liberation struggle in 1950.65  
Internally, the military situation in Việt Nam shifted in favor of the resistance forces, 
and the ICP officially re-emerged as the Việt Nam Workers’ Party (Đảng Lao Động 
Việt Nam) in 1951.  Consequently, beginning in 1950, more comprehensive and 
insistent land policies were formulated, and greater efforts were made to ensure the 
actual implementation of these policies.66       
The Central Standing Committee convened the Party’s Third National 
Conference from January 21 to February 3, 1950, to reevaluate the Party’s resistance 
guidelines and policies.  The Conference put forward ten tasks for 1950 to prepare to 
shift the protracted resistance into a full-fledged counterattack war.  For the first time, 
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class struggle was officially emphasized among the most important concerns that went 
hand-in-hand with the military struggle.67  On February 10, 1950, in the report called 
‘The Party’s Land Policy and the Problem of Investigating Rural Conditions’ at the 
Investigations of Rural Conditions Conference, Trường Chinh outlined a more radical 
land policy, which called for the complete realization of the slogan “người cày có 
ruộng” (land-to-the-tiller).  He argued that 50% of Việt Nam’s cultivatable land was in 
the hands of indigenous landowners, 25% was in the hands of the colonists, and only 
the remaining 25% belonged to the peasants who formed the majority of the 
Vietnamese population.  The numbers were somewhat disputable; however, they were 
used to illustrate the disparity that led to the exploitation of land rent, shortages in 
agricultural production, and the shortage of arable farmland for tillers.  Even though 
the ICP had implemented various land initiatives since the August Revolution to 
alleviate this disparity, those programs yielded very little success.  Therefore, he 
advocated a thorough reformation of the land system to abolish the colonial land 
system and feudal arrangements in agriculture and to create farmland for the tillers.  
Ultimately, the most important objective of these land reforms was to gain an 
advantage for the resistance.  However, he emphasized that these policies should not 
be permanent. Instead, it was necessary “to change and transform according to
national and international conditions different each time, according to the development 
of the resistance and its conditions.”  Sometime the policy was applied with a certain 
degree of leniency and calmness; at other time, it was swift and powerful. 68  
Accordingly, the land reform program was to follow three steps: first, those lands 
belonging to colonialists and traitors were to be confiscated without compensation and 
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redistributed among the poor peasants, land rent and interest rates were to be reduced, 
and cooperative agriculture was to be developed.  Second, the land of major 
landowners was to be confiscated, redistributed to the tillers, and remnants of the 
feudal system were to be eradicated.  Lastly, the exploitive land rent system was to be 
destroyed (turning landowners into peasants), and the slogan “land-to-the-tillers” was 
to be carried out.69  
However, at the time, his statement was just an ideological argument for a 
progressive reform that was to come later.  Trường Chinh understood that, as a 
practical matter, it was not possible to simultaneously implement a radical land reform 
and fight the resistance war.  Hardline reforms were to be delayed, in order to maintain 
a united front against the French.  Therefore, there was no immediate change in the 
ICP’s actual policy.  Instead, the focus was shifted more toward implementing the 
investigation of rural conditions, completing the first phase (reducing rent and interest 
rates), and preparing for more radical land reform.  Only when the anti-French 
resistance had become successful would the anti-feudal resistance begin.  The key 
objective then would be to “dispose of the exploitive land rent regime by disposing of 
the big landowners’ exploitive regime.”70    
Consequently, a large number of successive moderate decrees to implement 
provisional land redistributions and land rent reductions were ratified, thereby 
providing land to the peasants while also weakening the landowners’ economic 
position.  Beginning on Februrary 13, 1950, Hồ Chí Minh ratified decree 25/SL, 
extending the effects of previous land redistribution measures by classifying all 
abandoned lands according to the political behavior of the owners.  Lands belonging 
to Vietnamese traitors were confiscated, while the lands of absentee owners (lands left 
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behind by owners who had fled to the cities for security reasons) were temporarily 
allocated to tillers, but could eventually be returned if the political conduct of the 
owner during the resistance was deemed acceptable.71  On February 15, 1950, decree 
26/SL was ratified to establish the Communal Committee on Rent Reduction (ban 
giảm tô xã).  The responsibility of this committee was to investigate and resolve 
conflicts between tenants and landowners relating to rent reduction.72  On April 5, 
1950, the Central Committee issued a directive to Interzones Việt Bắc, III, and IV to 
investigate the situation in rural areas, to help the Party fix past mistakes and 
formulate a more extensive land reform policy for the future.73  In May, the DRV 
issued a decree expropriating all uncultivated and abandoned lands, temporarily 
allocating them to poor tillers, and exempting them from taxes for the first three 
years. 74   On May 22, 1950, the DRV issued decree 88/SL, defining tenancy 
regulations (thể lệ lĩnh canh) to protect the farming rights of tenants, and prohibiting 
landowners from reclaiming the land without permission.75   It was followed with
decree 89/SL, regulating interest rate reduction, remission, and implementing a 
moratorium on previous debts.76  This was supplemented with yet another decree in 
October 1950, which postponed all debts borrowed before the August Revolution; 
eradicated any debts in which the tenants had already paid interest equal to twice the 
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amount of the original loan; and reduced the interest rate on debts borrowed before the 
issuing of the decree.77  
On July 17, 1950, the Central Standing Committee ordered the completion of 
rent reduction and the beginning of the implementation of interest rate reduction.  
According to this directive, a number of landowners, rich peasants, and Catholics had 
not reduced rent by the 25% mandated by the government.  This was due to local 
administrative leaders’ inability to arouse the peasants to struggle against the 
landowners for rent reduction.  Hence, the Central Committee instructed its leaders to 
apply persuasion and the pressure of the masses to robustly force the landowners into 
reducing rent.  Regarding interest rate reduction, the directive requested the
implementation of decree 78/SL on reducing usurious interest rates, which required 
the elimination of old debts or high interest rates that poor peasants were incapable of 
repaying in full.  The directive detailed eight clauses, prescribing the necessary steps 
toward completing rent and interest reduction.78  Also on this day, in a directive to all 
party administrators, the ICP ordered further training of cadres to investigate rural 
conditions and to prepare for more extensive land reforms.79    
To advance its preparations for the implementation of land reform, the Central 
Standing Committee applied the information gathered from the investigations into 
rural conditions and issued a directive stipulating the standards for class demarcation 
in rural Việt Nam.  The objective was to create a uniform definition of each class, to 
avoid making previous mistakes when implementing future reforms.  The essential 
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standard for classification into socioeconomic classes in rural areas was based on the 
main source of income (ie. means of agricultural production) available for each person 
and each family.  It included land, cattle, farm tools, and houses.80  Based on these 
standards, the rural population was classified as follows:
a) Landowner: the rural bourgeoisie who did not work himself, but 
lived on land rent, usury, hiring labor, entrepreneurship, and trade.
b) Rich peasant: peasant who owned land and farm implements, and 
tilled his land himself, but also exploited others by hiring labor or 
leasing farmland to collect land rent and interest.
c) Middle class peasant: peasant who had enough land to till to meet 
the needs of his family, and his own farm implements, but lived 
solely by tilling his land without exploiting others.  This category 
also included peasants who did not own their own land, and rented 
their entire holding from the landowners.
d) Poor peasant: peasant who had very little land and farm 
implements; to meet his needs, he needed to rent additional land 
from others or sell his own labor.
e) Landless peasant: those without land or tools; he must sell his 
labor to live.81
The directive also declared that these standards of classification, by themselves, were 
not sufficient to correctly classify the rural population, and thus suggested that the 
opinions of the local people must also be taken into consideration.82  In general, these 
standards of classification were so complex and poorly defined that cadres were 
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unable to apply them correctly.83  This led to many problems of false and mistaken 
classifications, such as rich and middle class peasants being mistakenly classified as 
landowners and treated with more severity than was intended.  This was especially the 
case during the rigorous implementation of the Land Reform Proper.
By November 5, 1950, the ICP began to realizing that there were errors being 
committed that were detrimental to its rural policy.84  The ICP determined that these 
errors stemmed from two fundamental bureaucratic causes.  The first was the ICP 
leaders’ inability to popularize and manage the progress of its policy, and its officials’ 
extremist tendencies when executing the policy.  Second, cadres and local party 
members failed to fully comprehend the Party’s land, economic, and class policies in 
rural areas, and therefore were not able to garner the support for the resistance.85  
Consequently, the Party Central Standing Committee issued a directive to rectify these 
errors by emphasizing the need to rely on the collaboration of all rural social classes to 
fight off imperialist aggression and traitors, and to strengthen the people’s democratic 
government.86  However, based on annual reports from the Interzones, the success of 
implementing the land policies varied significantly, depending on the extent of geo-
political control the DRV had over an area.  Areas under DRV’s firm control, such as 
Phú Thọ, Thái Nguyên, Thái Bình, Ninh Bình, Nghệ An, and Thanh Hoá, yielded the 
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most success in the execution and response to the government policies, whereas 
reforms were much slower in areas in which the DRV did not have significant 
control.87   To address this matter, on November 17, 1950, the DRV issued three 
successive decrees (155/SL, 156/SL and 157/SL) to establish Interzone Military 
Tribunals (toà án quân sự liên khu), Interzone People's Courts (toà án nhân dân liên 
khu), and People's Courts (toà án nhân dân)  in order to firmly consolidate control of 
temporarily occupied areas and to better enforce its land policies.88  However, these 
tribunals and courts were most effectively established in areas under full or temporary 
control of the DRV, like provinces in Interzones Việt Bắc, III and IV.89    
From February 11 to 19, 1951, the ICP convened its Second National Party 
Congress in Tuyên Quang, publicly re-launching the communist party as the Việt Nam 
Workers’ Party (VWP, Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam) in order to legitimize and 
strengthen the Party’s leadership role in the resistance.90  At the conference, Trường 
Chinh read the Việt Nam Revolutionary Thesis (Luận Cương Cách Mạng Việt Nam), 
outlining three main objectives for the Vietnamese revolution: overthrow French 
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imperialism, abolish the feudal and semi-feudal system, and construct the basis for 
socialism.91  He emphasized that the driving motives for revolution were the people 
and the workers, and the fundamental aim during this transition stage was toward 
constructing a regime based on a dictatorship of the people, thereby making land 
reform one of the major concrete policies of the revolution.92  The landowners were 
defined as the main object of land reform and class struggle; however, they still played 
a vital role in the 1951 anti-imperialist struggle.  Therefore, to raise the peasant’s 
standard of living without infringing on the resistance’s great unity, the VWP’s rural 
policy during this period was limited yet again to the tasks of rent and interest rate 
reduction, and temporary allocation of land.93  However, this unity among all social 
classes varied significantly depending on the economic and political conditions of the 
time.  The VWP understood that during this anti-imperialist period, Việt Nam required 
the unity of the patriotic and democratic members of all classes in society.  As a result, 
it continued advocating for provisional recognition of landowner’s allegiance and their 
rights of citizenship and private property.  Only when conditions became more 
favorable toward anti-feudal resistance, would it come forward and lead the major 
class struggle against the landowners, implement land reforms, and achieve the 
ultimate objective of developing cooperative farming.94   
For years, the communist leadership had repeatedly proclaimed the need to 
sustain class unity in its attempts to reassure the richer rural classes (landowners and 
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rich peasants) that their positions were secure, while “buying” the support of poorer 
peasants’ with the promise of land rent and interest rate reductions.  However, this 
stance shifted dramatically in 1951 when the VWP officially emerged before the 
public, and openly announced its leadership role in the national resistance. 95  
Strengthened by the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the change in its 
military situation, the VWP leadership began more aggressively laying the 
groundwork for the future implementation of the land reform.  This was exemplified 
by decree 13/SL issued on May 1, 1951 and decree 40/SL issued on July 15, 1951, 
restructuring the previous taxation system by imposing a steep graduated tax, in order 
to weaken the elite economic structure by reducing the net income of landowners and 
rich peasants.  This tax replaced the existing range of taxes on land, trade, 
slaughtering, forestry, and other activities.  The tax was collected in the form of grain, 
and the rate was theoretically proportionate by class categorization: 6-10% for poor 
peasants, 10-20% for middle class peasants, and 30-50% for landowners.96  Although 
there were cases of understatement and outright tax evasion, overall the taxes 
generated a contribution that significantly improved the DRV’s budgetary situation, 
and helped consolidate its economic position.  On a related note, this tax system also 
produced estimates of individual landholdings and agricultural yields, which would be 
needed for subsequent land reform campaigns.  Theoretically, this tax system was 
meant to be implemented throughout all of Việt Nam; however, it was most effective 
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in areas that were under full control of the DRV and produced large amounts of grain, 
like Thanh Hoá, Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh.   
To consolidate its power, the VWP convened the First National Propaganda 
and Training Conference from August 21-30, 1951, to emphasize the vital function of 
political indoctrination and ideological leadership in the military.  The aim was to train 
cadres and soldiers with a firm ideological and political understanding, and to enhance 
their awareness of the class and ethnic struggles required to construct a lasting and 
enduring ideological resistance mentality. 97   On December 29, 1951, the Central 
Standing Committee issued a directive requiring party committees at all local levels to 
launch a purification campaign within the Party.  Its purpose was to correct mistakes 
committed by cadres and party members in order to enhance their ideological 
standards, and to reorganize the village-level branches of the VWP known as Party 
cells (chi bộ).98  The directive specified two tasks: 1) conduct short-term training to 
help cadres understand the situation and tasks, 2) for party members at the rural Party 
cell level, conduct short-term re-education and reorganization of the organization.99
By 1952, the VWP had gained significant strength, with much more favorable 
international and domestic conditions, exemplified by its public emergence in 1951.  
Though its land policy since 1945 had been constrained by the need to gain the 
support of the landowning class, it nonetheless had laid the necessary foundation for 
reform, and created significant changes in rural Việt Nam’s land and class relations 
with its temporary allocation of land policy, rent reduction policy, and newly instituted 
tax system.  At this point, the implementation of land reform took a more aggressive 
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tone, as it began to argue for a simultaneous undertaking of the anti-imperialist and 
anti-feudalist struggles. 100   Its attitude changed from the united front policy, and 
returned more closely to the original 1930 policy line of class struggle, which called 
for the radical confiscation of land from landowners and churches, to be redistributed 
among the poor and landless peasants.101
In a significant change of tone from previous years, the VWP’s land policy for
1952 presented at the Third Central Committee Conference blamed “hữu khuynh” 
(rightism) as the main cause of the improper application of its land policies.  It 
contended that the failures were not because the “landowners refused to reduce rent 
and interest rates, but because cadres were not able to understand the importance of 
the land policies,” and thus did not pay attention to the needs of the peasants.  The 
failure of the VWP leadership to vigorously support a speedy and aggressive 
implementation strategy led to cadres becoming too cautious toward the landowners.  
Furthermore, the leadership did not appropriately deal with exploitive rich peasants.  
For those reasons, it did not dare to mobilize the masses to struggle and demand the 
implementation of the policy.102  Thus, to accommodate this new tone, the VWP 
began prescribing increasingly aggressive strategies to efficiently enforce rent and 
interest rate reduction, and to correct previous errors in the implementation of its 
policies.  These strategies included promoting the VWP’s policy to both the peasants 
and the landowners, mobilizing the peasants to demand rent and interest rate 
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reductions to weaken the landowners’ influence, and guaranteeing the landowners’ 
right to collect rent and interest, in order to retain the landowners on the side of the 
resistance.103  
Furthermore, to consolidate power and respond to the relatively rapid 
expansion of the Party, the VWP began to carry out a major internal Party rectification 
campaign.  The purpose was to purge all elements from the VWP which could pose 
major threats to later policies, to furnish new class attitudes and educational attainment 
among cadres, and to prepare for the implementation of more radical policies.  This 
purification campaign was directed against commandism, individualism, subjectivism, 
bureaucratization, and corruption.  In May 1952, the VWP leaders opened their first 
class on Party purification, thus instituting their widest and most intensive campaign 
yet to reconstruct and reform its organization.  From the lowest cadre to the highest 
party committee, from the arts to the military, everyone, everything, and every aspect 
of life were in one way or another reeducated, criticized, self-criticized, corrected, and 
purified with communist ideologies and tactics.  The goal was to engrave in every 
cadre, party member, soldier, and person the communist ideological foundation and 
commitment needed to advance the resistance and the regime’s policies, to strengthen 
its authority, and to prepare for major land reform.104  
On August 15, 1952, a Central Executive Committee directive was issued to 
supplement directive 37 by defining ten specific clauses on rural policy.  These 
clauses included previous reform measures such as reducing rent and interest rates, 
opening wastelands and utilizing lands of absentee owners, temporarily allocating 
lands belonging to Frenchmen and Vietnamese collaborators to tillers, and utilizing 
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communal and  donated lands. But most telling was the dramatic change of tone in the 
VWP’s rural class strategy.  Instead of continuing to “pull the landowners into the 
resistance,” the strategy shifted to “pull in or neutralize some landowners, and expel 
imperialist and reactionary feudal large-landowners.”105  These words represented an 
important shift in the VWP’s rural policy compared to its previous stance, especially 
toward the landowners.  Combined with other rural regulations from 1951 to 1952, 
this shift could be seen as the first of the three steps toward distributionalist reform, 
consisting of mobilizing the masses to overthrow the landowning class, expropriating 
lands and redistributing them to the peasantry, and consolidating economic and 
political authority at the rural level.     
This shift was reflected most clearly in two events in the fall of 1952.  The first 
was the distribution of a paper entitled “Preliminary Comments on Mass Mobilization 
in 1953,” sent to the VWP leadership, namely Hồ Chí Minh and Trường Chinh, by the 
Chinese ambassador-advisor to Việt Nam, La Quý Ba.  Dated September 3, 1952, this 
7-page paper could arguably be considered as one of the principal factors contributing 
to the dynamic shift in the VWP’s 1952 land and class policy. More importantly, the 
paper served as the catalyst of the VWP’s mass mobilization and Land Reform Proper 
campaign between 1953 and 1956.  Divided into six main sections, the paper outlined 
the steps necessary to lead the mass mobilization movement, reorganize the village-
commune system, and win political dominance in the rural areas.  Its principal 
guideline was to mobilize the masses to attack and overcome the landowners’ 
influence, to gain political dominance in the rural areas, to satisfy the needs of the 
                                                
105 ‘Chỉ thị của ban chấp hành trung ương về chính sách ruộng đất của Đảng’ [Directive by the Central 
Executive Committee on the Party’s land policy].  ĐCSVN, vol. 13, p. 220-240, 239.
44
peasants [ie. redistribute lands], to increase agricultural production, and to garner the 
support of the resistance.106
A close comparative examination of the VWP’s land and mass mobilization 
policies before and after this paper was issued show that the paper had a significant 
influence on the development of the methodological structure for mass mobilization—
from words to content.  “Thẳng tay phát động quần chúng,” which literally means 
“harshly mobilize the masses,” was the maxim that brought “the sky-shaking and 
earth-shattering” fear to every Vietnamese in rural Việt Nam during the three-year 
period from 1953 to 1956.  The aim of mobilizing the masses was, in fact, the 
mobilization of massive class struggles between the poor peasants and rich 
landowners, to improve the economy, and to gain the support of the rural population 
needed to win the resistance war and consolidate political power.  Quý emphasized the 
need to “win the majority [peasants], isolate the minority [landowners], take advantage 
of their conflicts, and defeat each group.”107  That objective was combined with the 
reorganization of the village-commune organizations (Party cell, Peasants’ 
Association, administration, and rural armed forces) to win political dominance for the 
Party.  In the paper, Quý diagrammed specific strategies necessary to carry out mass 
mobilization.  To prepare, Quý advised the VWP leaders to investigate the land, class, 
organization, and cadre situations in the rural areas.  Using the information drawn 
from these assessments, they were directed to prepare and train 200 cadres and divide
them into 20 đoàn (brigades) to carry out mass mobilization experiments in 20 key 
village-communes in Interzone Việt Bắc and Interzone IV.108  
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The second event occurred on October 30 and 31, 1952, when Hồ Chí Minh 
sent two successive letters to the Soviet Union leader, Joseph Stalin, discussing the 
land reforms in Việt Nam.  In a letter signed on the 30th, Hồ stated that he had started 
developing the land reform program and would present it to Stalin.  In the letter, Hồ
also requested that two Soviet officials come to Viêt Nam to investigate the situation, 
and further requested 10 tons of malaria medicine, weapons, and permission for Việt 
Nam to send 50-100 Vietnamese students to the Soviet Union for training.  In the 
second letter, dated on the 31 of October, Hồ sent Stalin the VWP’s land reform 
program and asked for Stalin’s instructions.  In the letter, Hồ indicated that he 
composed the program with the help of two Chinese advisors, Lưu Shao Shi and Văn 
Sha San.109  
These two events somewhat clarify the reasons why the VWP began to shift its 
stance on land reforms, especially the influence that China and the Soviet Union had 
on the change.  Moreover, they also confirm that any land policies that came 
immediately before and after these events were aimed at preparing for class-struggle-
based land reforms.  Thus, to further prepare for mobilizing the masses (phát động 
quần chúng) and implement the VWP’s land policies of rent and interest rate reduction 
in 1953, on November 25, 1952, the VWP’s Secretariat ordered further investigations 
into rural conditions.  These measures were designed to overthrow the landowning 
class, to weaken the feudal influences, and to win political dominance for the VWP in 
rural Việt Nam.  The task of mass mobilization was envisioned as a tense class 
struggle that would require thoughtful preparation and a clear understanding of the 
rural situation.  Therefore, investigating and understanding the agricultural, economic, 
class, and political conditions of rural Việt Nam were necessary.  Rural class relations 
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were particularly important, because only through understanding these relationships 
could the VWP exploit the divisions between classes and ignite class struggle.  A 
threefold strategy was employed to complete this task: first, to explore the exploitive 
interclass relationships in the rural areas and the impact of the VWP’s land policies; 
second, to survey the conditions of the masses and the cadres’ ability to improve them; 
third, to identify the rural traitors, reactionaries, and insubordinate elements, and 
particularly to examine their relationships with each other.  This was achieved by 
sending cadre brigades (đoàn cán bộ) to communes to carry out the investigation.  
Members of each team were required to have a thorough grasp of the VWP’s land 
policy, a clear and firm stance on class, the ability to demarcate class, to behave 
properly, and to have an enthusiastic spirit toward learning about the masses.  During 
the investigative process, it was stressed that the teams were to follow the defined 
methods and resources provided by the central government to assist them in their 
investigations.  All investigation teams were required to explore four situations: the 
status of past and current rural exploitation; the progress in implementing the Party’s 
land policies; the relationships among the landowners, rich, middle class, poor, and 
landless peasants; and the effectiveness of cadres and party members at the commune 
Party cell. 110   The investigations were required to rely primarily on information 
derived from the poor and landless peasants and the Peasants’ Association.  The Party 
emphasized that the investigation "must be urgently implemented, and completed 
before August 5, 1953” under the supervision of the Interzone Executive Committee 
and Provincial Executive Committee.111  Again, the investigation was intended to help 
the VWP leaders gain a precise understanding of the rural conditions while 
formulating their land reform policies. These policies were ratified and enforced just a 
                                                
110 “Mẫu điều tra nông thôn’ [Investigations of the rural template].  ĐCSVN, vol. 13, p. 351-356.  
111 ‘Thông tri của ban bí thư về việc điều tra nông thôn’ [Notification from the Party Secretariat 
regarding Investigations of the rural areas], 25 Nov. 1953.  ĐCSVN, vol. 13, p. 347-350.
47
few months after the deadline for completing the investigation.  This indicates a clear 
and systematic preparation in the development of land reform policy.   
At the Fourth Plenum of the Việt Nam Worker’s Party, held from January 25 
to 30, 1953, Hồ Chí Minh read a report underlining the two main tasks that needed to 
be enforced in 1953 in order to gain a complete victory for the resistance.  These tasks 
included leading the resistance and its military policy, and mobilizing the masses to 
further reduce rents and fully implement land reform.  Concerning the land policy, Hồ
argued that because of “special circumstances,” only rent and interest rate reduction 
was implemented during the years before 1953.  However, given that circumstances 
had changed, it was necessary for the revolution to expand its land policies and 
“improve the economic and political interests of the peasants” by enforcing more 
radical land reforms, namely redistributing land to the peasants.  By accomplishing 
this feat, the VWP would then be able to fully mobilize the necessary manpower from 
the peasantry to advance the protracted resistance and gain absolute victory.112  
Two developments that could have strongly influenced the VWP’s policies, 
especially its land policy, were the the rising global influence of the Soviet Union and 
the completion of land reform in China in 1953.  The VWP looked to the political and 
economic paths and policies of its larger allies as the model for its own revolutionary 
path.  Therefore, in a lengthy report following Hồ’s theme, Trường Chinh argued that 
it was necessary to take advantage of the support of the Soviet Union and China to 
simultaneously overthrow French imperialism and feudalism.  In the report, he also 
defined the specific purpose, meaning, motto, methods, and plans for implementing 
the land reform policies.  Changing its revolutionary tone, he suggested that the reason 
why radical rent and interest rate reductions had not been implemented during the 
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resistance years was that the degree of cooperation of the landowners with the 
resistance had been overestimated.  But in reality, he emphasized that the landowners 
were not cooperative partners, but instead were feudal reactionaries who worked 
against the government’s resistance and its policies.  As a result, he aggressively 
called for “launching the masses to thoroughly reduce rent; to carry out interest rate 
reduction; to prepare to make progress toward land reform; and to achieve land-to-the-
tillers.”  Only when these policies were fully enforced, would the VWP “be able to 
motivate the peasants to enthusiastically sacrifice for the resistance, step up 
production, and consolidate the rural government.”113  Based on those premises, the 
conference issued a resolution to implement the VWP’s land policies.  Their 
fundamental mission was to “destroy the land ownership regime of the French 
colonialists and other invasive imperialists in Việt Nam, eliminate the feudal land 
ownership regime of landowners and foreign aliens, and implement the policies of 
land ownership by the peasantry.”114  In order to prepare for the full enforcement of 
this policy in 1954, the resolution specified five main tasks to be implemented in 
1953.  The essence of these tasks was to purify and reorganize the Party at all levels, 
in order to strengthen the Party’s ability to lead the mass mobilization campaign.115   
This plenum marked the most important change in the VWP’s resistance policy 
since 1945.  By making the national resistance movement synonymous with both anti-
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imperialism and anti-feudalism, it suggested that the two were intimately related and 
thus must also be simultaneously implemented.  This more aggressive stance toward 
implementing land reform by means of mass mobilization was a significant shift from 
previous years, but as evidenced by Hồ’s letters to Stalin and La Quý Ba’s letter in 
1952, it is not surprising.  Furthermore, it could be argued that such a transformation 
was facilitated by the change in political conditions, as repeatedly defined in the 
VWP’s political platform and earlier policies.  When the Party’s political and 
economic power was still weak, anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism were separated 
into two independent objectives as a means to utilize the landowning class’ support to 
sustain the Party’s feeble resistance forces.  After a period of consolidation, by 1953, 
the united front policy was becoming unnecessary as the resistance forces gained 
strength.  Consequently, the elimination and overthrow of the landowning class to 
advance the resistance became possible.116
Beginning with that plenum, successive mass mobilization initiatives were 
immediately undertaken to prepare for the upcoming land reforms.  In February 1953, 
a national conference was convened on mobilizing the peasants and the people, to 
define the peasants’ role in the resistance, enhance the ideological stance of the 
peasant class and set up the logistical means to lead the peasants during the 
resistance.117  A political re-education campaign was set up to rectify party members 
and administrative official’s political thoughts and work styles.118   On March 16, 
1953, the DRV issued a circular reforming the administrative system at the village 
level via the mass mobilization campaign.  Building upon the previous tasks of 
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reorganizing the cadres, dividing communes, and reforming cadres and officials’ work 
styles, this directive aimed to form uncorrupted administrative authorities, tighten the 
relationship between the government and the people, and protect the economic 
interests and political advantage of the VWP in the rural areas.119  On April 12, Hồ
Chí Minh signed three successive decrees to supplement the implementation of the 
VWP’s land policies.  Decree 149/SL prescribed specific land regulations (such as rent 
and interest rate reduction, land tenancy, land confiscation, and land redistribution) for 
which the masses were being mobilized.120  Decree 150/SL established the Special 
People’s Tribunal in areas implementing mass mobilization, to ensure the full 
implementation of the land policies, the maintenance of social order, and the 
strengthening of the People’s government.121  Decree 151/SL defined the authority to 
punish (trừng trị) landowners who resisted or sabotaged the mass mobilization 
campaign, in order to maintain revolutionary order and to strengthen the solidarity of 
the people's resistance. 122   The Prime Minister also issued two decrees, detailing 
regulations to implement the above decrees.  
Immediately after issuing those decrees, the first experimental mass 
mobilization campaign was launched from April 15, 1953, to August 1953, in 22 
communes in Interzone Việt Bắc and Interzone IV, specifically in Thái Nguyên 
province and Thanh Hoá province.123  This was the beginning of eight successive 
                                                
119 Viện Sử Học, Việt Nam: những sự kiện lịch sử (1945-1975) [Việt Nam: historical events (1945-
1975)] (Việt Nam: NXBGD, 2002), p. 119.
120 Sắc lệnh số 149/SL [Decree No. 149/SL].  23 April 2010.  <http://luat.xalo.vn/phap-luat/Sac-
lenh/122847910/Sac-lenh-Ve-viec-quy-dinh-ve-chinh-sach-ruong-dat.html>.
121 Sắc lệnh số 150/SL [Decree No. 150/SL].  23 April 2010.  <http://luat.xalo.vn/phap-luat/Sac-
lenh/122849897/Sac-lenh-Ve-viec-thanh-lap-Toa-an-nhan-dan-Dac-biet-o-nhung-noi-phat-dong-quan-
chung-thi-hanh-chinh-sach-ruong-dat.html>.
122 Sắc lệnh số 151/SL [Decree No. 151/SL].  23 April 2010.  <http://luat.xalo.vn/phap-luat/Sac-
lenh/122851884/Sac-lenh-Ve-viec-trung-tri-dia-chu-chong-phap-luat-trong-khi-va-o-nhung-noi-phat-
dong-quan-chung-thi-hanh-chinh-sach-ruong-dat.html>.
123 Note how the number of communes and the area of the campaign is significantly similar to that 
suggested by La Quý Ba in 1953; Viện Sử Học, Việt Nam: những sự kiện lịch sử (1945-1975) [Việt 
Nam: historical events (1945-1975)] (Việt Nam: NXBGD, 2002), p. 123.  
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waves of rent reduction that ended on December 31, 1955, during which 1,875 
communes were mobilized. 124   Seven days later, the Party Secretariat issued a 
directive defining ten disciplinary clauses, specifying the exact logistics for cadres to 
carry out the mass mobilizations, to ensure the proper implementation of the VWP’s 
land policies.  The clauses may be divided into three separate subject-groups: five 
dealing with peasants, three with landowners, and two with Party members.125  On 
April 24, 1953, the Party Central Executive Committee issued a directive on mass 
mobilization for 1953, detailing guidelines for the enforcement of decrees 149/SL, 
150/SL and 151/SL.  The bottom line was to rely on the strength of the poor and 
landless peasants to overthrow the influence of feudalism, win political control over 
rural areas, increase production, advance the resistance, and prepare for land 
reforms.126  There were four necessary objectives: first, to formulate slogans for the 
struggle, based on the aspirations of the majority; second, to educate and organize the 
masses to make them self-aware and able to struggle voluntarily; third, to find and 
organize the faithful poor and landless peasants and groom them to be village leaders 
known as cốt cán (“backbone elements”)127 to help the Party govern; and fourth, to 
mobilize the peasants by establishing Peasants’ Associations as the core organs of the 
movement.  To achieve these objectives, cadres were obliged to have a thorough grasp 
of the Party’s specific policy toward each class in the countryside.  This required 
gaining the support of the middle class, poor and landless peasants, and pitching them 
                                                
124 Trần Phương, ed. Cách mạng ruộng đất ở Việt Nam [The land revolution in Vietnam] p. 107-108.
125 ‘Chỉ thị của ban bí thư về 10 điều kỷ luật của cán bộ trong khi thi hành chính sách ruộng đất’ 
[Directive by the Party Secretariate on the 10 disciplines for cadres during the implementation of the 
land policies], 22 April 1953.  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 171-172.
126 Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong.  Dựa Vào Bần Cố Nông Đoàn Kết Chặt Chẽ Với Trung Nông [Rely on 
the poor and landless peasants, unite closely with the middle peasants]  Việt Nam:  Nhà Xuất Bản Sự
Thật, 1953.
127 A “Cốt cán” or “backbone element” is a peasant chosen by the local land-reform cadre to become a 
village leader. 
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against the rich peasants and landowners in order to eradicate the latter group’s 
economic and political influence.128
On May 4, 1953, the Party Politburo issued a directive stipulating five 
measures for mass mobilization.  The focus was on defining Party and cadre’s 
authority, and punishments for disciplining “cruel” and reactionary landowners.  It set
up the Disciplinary Committee (Ủy ban Xử trí), to investigate, collect and preserve 
information about offenders.  This committee rendered opinions on how to punish 
offenders, and presented them to the President of the DRV for approval.  Once 
approved, the Special People’s Courts enforced the sentence.  The aim was to punish 
reactionary agitators who committed crimes and sabotaged the resistance.  
Punishments were mainly based on class, but were sometimes made more lenient if 
the offender had a relationship with the resistance.  Landowners who participated in or 
had family members in the resistance, and willingly implemented land reform and paid 
taxes were, according to a directive on July 13, 1953, exempt from persecution.  
Others who had merit with the resistance before and during the August Revolution or 
had children in the military were required to self-criticize and be criticized publicly, 
but were also exempted.129  The ICP leadership determined the number of offenders 
who were to be executed.  However, this percentage was not universally applied 
among all communes under mass mobilization, as some communes had 3 to 4 
landowners executed, while others executed just one or none.  Executions were kept to  
a minimum, due to the fear of losing the public’s sympathy.130  
                                                
128 ‘Chỉ thị ban chấp hành trung ương về phát động quần chúng trong năm 1953’ [Directive from the 
Central Executive Committee regarding mass mobilization in 1953], 24 April 2953.  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, 
p. 173-176.
129 ‘Chỉ thị của bộ chính tri về việc lập danh sách các thân sĩ tiến bộ và cách xử trí với họ’ [Directive 
from the Politburo on listing progressive notables and how to deal with them], 13 July 1953.  ĐCSVN, 
vol. 14, p. 258-261.
130 ‘Chỉ thị của bộ chính trị về mấy vấn đề đặc biệt trong phát động quần chúng’ [Directive by the 
Politburo on several special issues regarding mass mobilization], 4 May, 1953.  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 
201-203.
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After a short experimental period of implementing mass mobilization to reduce 
rents, the Politburo issued a resolution in August 1953 to improve the mass
mobilization campaign.131  That resolution was followed by a more detailed directive 
issued on September 7, 1953, which identified the steps, methods, and requirements 
needed to mobilize the masess to demand rent reduction and to lay the transitional 
groundwork for land reforms.  Significantly different from the more conservative 
measures of previous years, these steps were intended to be quick, robust, and simple, 
but also to achieve good results.  The process was divided into five steps: 1) 
propagate, educate, and recruit rễ (“root” cadres); 2) train and educate the roots (rễ), to 
choose the objects of persecution; 3) organize stringing beads (xâu chuỗi), for a 
preliminary reorganization of local institutions; 4) overturn cruel village bullies 
(cường hào gian ác), and redistribute confiscated items; 5) rectify village organization, 
educate the peasants, and divide communes.  The whole process was required to be 
implemented within a concentrated area, and advanced in consecutive waves to avoid 
their previous mistakes of overextension and jumping ahead.132  To accelerate the 
process, the August resolution required that each wave of rent reduction and 
mobilization be carried out and completed in a period of two months.133  
On November 10, 1953, the Party Secretariat issued a directive on reorganizing 
the rural Party cells (chi bộ) during mass mobilization.  The Party cells were divided 
into three categories.  The good Party cells were those that could definitely be counted 
on to mobilize the masses.  The regular Party cells were primarily under Party control, 
                                                
131 ‘Nghị quyết của hội nghị bộ chính trị về chỉnh đốn công tác phát động quần chúng’ [Resolution by 
the Politburo Conference on rectification of the task of mass mobilization].  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 277-
293.
132 ‘Chỉ thị của bộ chính trị về bước tiến, phương pháp và yêu cầu cụ thể trong phát động quần chúng 
giảm tô’ [Directive from the Politburo on the concrete steps, methods, and requirements for advancing 
mass mobilization], 7 Sept. 1953.  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 320-333.
133 ‘Nghị quyết của hội nghị bộ chính trị về chỉnh đốn công tác phát động quần chúng’ [Resolution by 
the Politburo Conference on rectification of the task of mass mobilization].  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 293.
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but had been penetrated and influenced by landowners and bullies, while the bad Party 
cells were under the complete control of the landowners and bullies, with very few 
loyal and effective members.  Individual party members were also ranked according to 
three categories of bad, weak, and good.  The bad members were the spies, disloyal 
reactionaries, and elements who came from the exploitive class.  Weak members had a 
clean record, but in general were uneducated and unwilling to improve.  The good 
members were more educated and more experienced, and had the potential to advance 
in rank.  With such a diverse mix of members within the Party cells, the VWP leaders 
had to carry out a reorganization to purify and strengthen the foundation of the Party at 
the rural level and to prepare more favorable circumstances needed for the future 
implementation of land reforms.  Two requirements were necessary in order to realize 
this aim.  First, party members needed to understand the boundary between themselves 
and their enemies (imperialists, traitors, and reactionaries) and their particular 
relationship with the peasants opposed to the landowners, in order to recognize their 
obligations toward the Party and the peasant masses.  Second, the Party had to expel 
elements such as traitors, reactionaries and cruel village bullies, landowners, and rich 
peasants who committed political crimes against the party and the government.  In 
addition, the directive also prescribed detailed policies to deal with each type of 
member.134
At the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Executive Committee and the First 
National Conference from November 11 to 23, 1953, the VWP leaders convened and 
decided to use a supplemented version of the land program drafted at the Fourth 
Plenum in January 1953, to launch a systematic and sweeping land reform program.  
Hồ Chí Minh, in his report to the conference, defined the objectives of pushing the 
                                                
134 ‘Chỉ thị của ban bí thư về chính đốn chi bộ nông thôn trong phát động quần chúng’ [Directive by the 
Party Secretariat on reorganizing the rural Party cells in mass mobilization], 10 Nov. 1953.  ĐCSVN, 
vol. 14, p. 356-364.
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resistance forward and carrying out land reform as the two central tasks for 1954.135  
Trường Chinh, in an elaborate report entitled “Implementation of Land Reform,” 
outlined the terms of the land reform policy and the methods for implementing land 
reform in Việt Nam.136  Both Hồ Chính Minh and Trường Chinh insisted that in order 
to be able to implement land reform, class boundaries must be clearly defined, to 
differentiate between “ta” (us) and “địch” (the enemy).  This class boundary inevitably 
forged a class struggle between the peasants (“ta”) against the landowners (“địch,”), 
and thus shaped the content of the Land Reform Law ratified by the DRV National 
Assembly on December 4, 1953, into a regulation promoting a widespread and 
aggressive class struggle.137  
Table 3.1: Waves of Rent Reduction and Land Reform
Sources: Land Reform data from Trần Phương (1968), p. 107-108.  Rent Reduction 
data from various reports, including Trần Phương’s total estimation.     
                                                                                                                                    
Rent 
Reduction 
Wave 
(RR)
Land 
Reform 
Wave (LR)
Dates Villages
RR LR
1 April-May 1953 22 ---
2 Aug.-Oct. 1953 163 ---
3 Experimental 25/12/53-30/03/54 --- 6
4 572 ---
5 1 25/05/54-20-09-54 --- 53
6 2 23/10/54-15/01/55 255 210
7 3 18/02/55-20/06/55 344 466
8 4 27/06/55-31/12/55 519 859
                                                
135 ‘Báo cáo của chủ tịc Hồ Chí Minh về tình hình trước mắt và nhiệm vụ cải cách ruộng đất’ [Report by 
Hồ Chí Minh on the present situation and the task of land reform].  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 369-383.  
136 ‘Thực hiện cải cách ruộng đất’ [Implemention of land reform] a report read by Trường Chinh at the 
Fifth Party Central Executive Committee Plenum.  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 384-456.
137 ‘Luật cải cách ruộng đất năm 1953’ [Land Reform Law for 1953].  QHNCHXHCNVN, vol 1. p. 
396; As defined in Article I, the objective and purpose was “to abolish the regime of land appropriation 
by the French colonists and wipe out the feudal regime of land ownership by the landowning class, in 
order to set up a regime of land ownership by the peasants, give a strong impetus to agricultural 
production, pave the way for industrial and commercial development, and improve the peasants’ living 
conditions,” and support the resistance.
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Table 3.1 (Continued)                                                                                                      
5 25/12/55-30/07/56 --- 1720
Total 1875 3314
Table 3.2:  The number of xã (village/commune) undergoing land reform in each 
province, by waves
Source: Trần Phương (1968), p. 107-108.
Wave Area of 
Implemenation
No. of xã being 
implemented
Total No. of xã in 
each wave
Experimental Thái Nguyên 6 6
Wave 1
Thái Nguyên 47
53Thanh Hoá 6
Wave 2
Thái Nguyên 22
210
Phú Thọ 100
Bắc Giang 22
Thanh Hoá 66
Wave 3
Phú Thọ 106
466
Bắc Giang 84
Vĩnh Phúc 65
Sơn Tây 22
Thanh Hoá 115
Nghệ An 74
Wave 4
Phú Thọ 17
859
Bắc Giang 116
Vĩnh Phúc 111
Bắc Ninh 60
Sơn Tây 71
Hà Nam 98
Ninh Bình 47
Thanh Hoá 207
Nghệ An 5
Hà Tĩnh 227
Wave 5
Bắc Ninh 86
1,720
Hải Dương 217
Hưng Yên 149
Thái Bình 294
Kiến An 85
Ninh Bình 45
Hà Đông 163
Nam Định 171
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
Thanh Hoá 19
Nghệ An 250
Hà Tĩnh 6
Quang Bình 118
Vĩnh Linh zone 21
Hà Nội 47
Hải Phòng 9
Hồng Quang zone 40
Total 3,314
As shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, following the ratification of this law, the 
DRV immediately carried out an experimental wave of Land Reform between 
December 25, 1953 and March 1954 in six villages in Thái Nguyên province.  This 
was followed by five waves of reform, known as the Land Reform Proper campaign, 
which lasted until July 30, 1956.  During this time, 3,314 villages were reformed.138  
The first person executed was Nguyễn Thị Năm, a female landowner from Thái 
Nguyên province.  She was famously known as mẹ kháng chiến (mother of the 
resistance) for her strong merits with the revolution.139
The period from 1950 to 1953 could be seen as an interim phase between the 
earlier united front line and the later anti-feudalist/distributionalist line.  There was a 
steady coagulation of policy with actual realization of earlier policies.  The 
Communist Party had begun to further consolidate its position via the purification of 
of its own organization, the training of more cadres to prepare for the land reform 
campaigns, and the reorganization of the fundamental rural administrative structure.  
All these factors combined, led to the beginning of major mass mobilization necessary 
                                                
138 Trần Phương, ed. Cách mạng ruộng đất ở Việt Nam [The land revolution in Vietnam] p. 107-108.
139 Nguyễn Quang Duy.  ‘Bà Cát Thành Long Nguyễn Thị Năm và ông Hồ Chí Minh’ [Cat Thanh Long 
Nguyen Thi Nam and Ho Chi Minh].  Dân Luận.  03 July 2010.  20 July 2010.  
<http://danluan.org/node/5567>
58
to destroy the remaining opponents (via land reform), to transform the rural power 
over to the Party, and to establish the preconditions for the transition to socialism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PLANS FOR MASS MOBILIZATION: THE STORY OF “THREE TOGETHERS”
This chapter depicts the process of mass mobilization and how this process
ignited a class struggle among the different social classes in rural Việt Nam.140  Phát 
động quần chúng (mass mobilization) was the most important process in the 
Vietnamese land reform program.  Its goals were to mobilize the poor and landless 
peasants to overturn the economic and political influence of feudalism, to win political 
dominance for the Party, and subsequently to establish a proletarian dictatorship in the 
countryside.  The campaign was applied both during the land rent reduction phase and 
the Land Reform Proper phase.  Almost identical techniques were used in both phases, 
with the only notable differences being an increase in the level of violence and a 
broadening of the types of property subject to confiscation.141  The process was tightly 
and uniformly organized and directed.  Between 1953 and 1956, it was extended to 
most village-communes in rural North Việt Nam.  Each commune underwent mass 
mobilization under the supervision of a đội công tác (work team) that reported to the 
VWP’s central authorities, with the intention of suppressing the economically wealthy 
and politically influential rural bourgeoisie. 
Mass mobilization consisted of a systematic series of actions that began with 
the central authorities carefully selecting a site, usually a xã (commune).  To launch a 
successful campaign, the xã had to be a place in which the military and political 
                                                
140 The sources used for this chapter derived from interviews with local Vietnamese who had 
experienced the land reform.  It included accounts from Lý Thị Diệu from Thanh Hoá, Trần Văn Tôn 
from Thái Nguyên, Bùi Thị Đào from Ninh Bình, Nguyễn Hữu Lộc from Thanh Hoá, Đặng Minh from 
Hà Nội, Lê Cẩm Ninh from Phú Thọ, Nguyễn Thị Soan from Thanh Hoá, Phan Văn Lưu from Bắc 
Ninh.
141 The Land Rent Reduction campaign was implemented in eight waves, between Apil 1953 and 
December 31, 1955.  The Land Reform Proper campaign was implemented in six waves (including the 
experimental wave) from December 25, 1953 to July 30, 1956.  Mass mobilization was carried out 
during both campaigns.  
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situation was comparatively stable.  After selecting the site, a đội (team) of specially 
trained mass-mobilization cadres were sent into the xã.  Through the local Party cell, 
the đội surveyed the general situation in the xã, reformed organizations, convened 
various meetings, and publicized government policies to the population.  Throughout 
the process, particular attention was given to social groups deemed likely to be useful 
for later mobilization efforts.  Disguised as peasants, members of the cadres went 
down to the masses to mobilize them and investigate the conditions in each xã.  They 
sought out 15 to 20 of the poorest peasants or laborers in the xã, making direct contact 
with these people by asking for permission to live in their houses.142  They then 
applied the ‘three togethers’ strategy which included cùng ăn (eating together), cùng ở
(living together), and cùng làm (working together) with the peasants and their 
families.  
The cadre usually stayed in the xã for an extended period of about two to three 
months, and acquainted themselves with peasant tasks of all kinds.  Using the tactic of 
thăm nghèo hỏi khổ (visiting the poor and asking about their sufferings), they probed 
into the peasants’ poverty.143  The emphasis of this strategy was twofold: by probing 
into every detail of their hosts’ lives, the cadres were able to investigate, at the 
individual level, the conditions, the socio-political makeup, and especially the class 
relationships between the rich (landowners) and the poor (peasants) in the commune.  
Moreover, by inquiring into the grievances of the poor, the cadres would try to win 
over their hosts’ trust and hearts, and thus be able to start mobilizing the peasants into 
action.  Emphasizing the peasants’ poverty versus the landowners’ abundance, the 
cadres indoctrinated the peasants into the cause of social and class disparities.  
                                                
142 ‘Chỉ thị của bộ chính trị về bước tiến, phương pháp và yêu cầu cụ thể trong phát động quần chúng 
giảm tô’ [Directive from the Politburo on the concrete steps, methods, and requirements in advancing 
mass mobilization], 7 Sept. 1953.  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 324.
143 ‘Nghị quyết của hội nghị bộ chính trị về chỉnh đốn công tác phát động quần chúng’ [Resolution by 
the Politburo Conference on rectification of the task of mass mobilization].  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 293.
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Blaming the landowners, they convinced the peasants that all their bad luck and 
sufferings were caused by the cruel and ruthless landowners’ exploitation, and not 
fate.  Through such psychological manipulation, the cadres instilled into the minds of 
the peasants the ideological cause of exploitation and suffering, and ignited in them 
the resentment and hatred necessary for a class struggle against the landowners.  
They continued, day and night, to intensively indoctrinate the docile peasants, 
until these peasants understood that the only way to improve their lives was to support 
the causes of the Party, which included overturning their vile exploiters.  The 
ideologically mobilized peasant was called rễ (root).  Once the peasant was fully 
instilled with resentment towards landowners, the cadre withdrew from the peasant’s 
house and ceased all direct involvement in the village.  From here on, the cadre carried 
out its mission by employing the roots as its mobilization agent, ordering them to 
recruit other poor and landless peasants.  The newly mobilized peasants were labeled 
chuỗi (beads).  This chain recruiting process was called bắt rễ xâu chuỗi (growing 
roots and stringing beads).  The roots, being the most important element in the whole 
program, also had the responsibility of connecting with cadres from nearby villages to 
exchange information.  Every detail of village life was thoroughly investigated and 
documented, whether it be about land ownership or about a person randomly fishing at 
a local pond, because such information, no matter how irrelevant and flawed, could be 
used during public denunciations.  As the core instrument of mass mobilization was 
established, and hatred  of the landowners was implanted, the cadres relied on the poor 
peasants to draw out the middle class peasants, and to organize a commune Peasants’ 
Association.  This Peasants’ Association was directed to begin mobilizing the 
remainder of the people to struggle against and overthrow the landowners, traitors, 
reactionaries, and bullies.  This process effectively organized the mobilizing entities 
needed to incite the class struggle, and also relieved the cadres from the responsibility 
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of having to directly carry out the action.  This gave the public impression that the 
movement was naturally spurred by the peasants’ own desires to overthrow the 
landowning class.144
After amassing enough information about a village, a member of the cadre 
would make a personal report before a Provincial Party Committee (tỉnh ủy).  There, 
with the consultation of the Committee, he profiled and classified the population of the 
village.  He identified the landowners, and imputed to them whatever crimes were 
necessary to put them on trial.  Starting from this point, the đoàn cải cách ruộng đất 
(land reform battalion) arrived to take on full responsibility for supervising village 
affairs.  It appointed the cốt cán (backbone elements— the trained roots and beads) to 
barricade and police the whole village, cutting off all unauthorized communication in 
and out of the village, while they awaited the rulings from the higher authorities. 
Once approved by the higher authorities, the campaign of population 
classification officially began.  This process involved the training of poor and landless 
peasants on how to classify the village population into different classes and categories.  
For guidance, the government provided the peasants with documents of regulations 
and specific methods.145  After days of intensive study and discussion, those who 
attended the course deliberated on the classification of landowners, which were 
carefully divided into three classes: traitorous, reactionary, and cruel landowners; 
ordinary landowners; and resistance landowners (those who participated in the 
                                                
144 ‘Chỉ thị của ban chấp hành trung ương về phát động quần chúng trong năm 1953’ [Directive by the 
Party Central Executive Committee regarding mass mobilization in 1953].  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 187.
145 Sources for training cadres and peasants included: Vì đâu tôi khổ [Why am I suffering?], Đường Lối 
Phát Động Quần Chúng [The ways to launch the masses], Đội Về Đây Đời Ta Tươi Sáng: Tiến Lên 
[Our lives have brightened since the team arrived: march forward], Coi Chùng Địa Chủ Rất Ngoan Cố
[Watchout, the landowners are very stubborn], Nhớ Lấy Để Trả Thù: Tôi Có 12 Anh Em Nay Chỉ Còn 
Một Mình Tôi [Remember to take revenge: I have 12 siblings and I am the only survivor], Phải Đánh 
Đổ Chúng Nó [Must overthrow them], Truyện Chị Khoan: gương mẫu trong phát động quần chúng
[The story of sister Khoan: an exemplary of mass mobilization], Vùng Lên [Revolt], Kinh Nghiệm về
Phơng Pháp Lãnh Đạo Trong Việc Cải Cách Ruộng Đất của Lưu-Trấn-Bản [Experience and methods 
to lead in land reform by Lưư Trấn Bản].
63
Resistance).146  In practice, most if not all of the landowners, even those who had 
served the DRV administration or had been decorated by Hồ Chí Minh for their 
achievements, were placed in the first class and charged with crimes, irrespective of 
their previous relationship with the resistance.147  However, this discrimination was 
not absolute, as anyone’s class status could be raised or lowered, depending largely on 
his/her attitude during the mobilization campaign.  As a result, many landowners 
became humble and obedient.  However, a large number of landowners still could not 
escape trial for treason, because the campaign had previously stipulated a fixed 
number of death sentences and terms of penal servitude.148  After the head of the 
landowning family had been arrested, the cadres would fabricate accusations to exert 
pressure on the family members, primarily to extort money and jewelry.  Besides
losing their property and enduring various modes of humiliation and mistreatment, 
members of the landowners’ families were also isolated from having any contact with 
anyone.  This included preventing them from working outside the house, thus leading 
to many deaths due to starvation.149  
During this process, peasants attended special classes on exposing crimes, in 
which they were taught how the landowners had cheated, robbed, exploited, and 
oppressed them.  They were provided with a long list of typical crimes, to use to 
accuse and incriminate the landowners for whom they had previously worked.  Those 
who were specifically trained came to be known as ‘denouncers’.  Each denouncer had 
to make at least one accusation against the landowner on trial.  These denouncers 
                                                
146 All landowners who remained in the Communist zone up to 1953 had, played some part in the 
Resistance, whether they wanted to or not, since Communist policy was such that nobody could remain 
completely inactive.  
147 Exemplify by the case of Nguyễn Thị Năm from Thái Nguyên province.  She was a resistance 
landowner who had strong credentials with the revolution, but was the first person to be executed in 
Land Reform. 
148 ‘Chỉ thị của bộ chính trị về mấy vấn đề đặc biệt trong phát động quần chúng’ [Directive by the 
Politburo regarding several special issues in mass mobilization].  ĐCSVN, vol. 14, p. 201-202.
149 Hoàng Văn Chí, From Colonialism to Communism (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1964), p. 156-
157.
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could be roughly placed into three categories.  The first were people who were drawn 
in by the promise of material rewards or political privileges.  The second were those 
who wished to protect themselves and avoid trouble.  Lastly were those who 
denounced other due to fear of being falsely accused themselves or found guilty by 
association.  The mass mobilization campaign was so thorough and caused so much 
fear that it left very few, if any, choices for people living in the communes being 
mobilized.  It did not matter whether they agreed or not; they were all obligated to 
participate in one manner or another.  
After compiling their lists of crimes attributed to the landowners, the 
‘denouncers’ were given careful training on public denunciation, to help make their 
denunciations look more convincing before the accused in the presence of a multi-
village crowd that could extend from ten to twenty thousand people.  Under the 
guidance and supervision of a cadre, the denouncers practiced their roles by rehearsing 
verbal phrases, delivering pre-drafted speeches that they had memorized, and 
performing bodily gestures and actions in front of a straw dummy to create a sense of 
realism and sincerity.  The denunciation trial would begin once all the preparations 
were completed and the date of denouncing was assigned.  On the denouncing day, a 
multi-village crowd of ten to twenty thousand peasants would amass in an open field.  
The crowd sat on the ground facing the tribunal.  The president of the tribunal would 
open the denunciation by declaring the task of overthrowing the traitorous and 
reactionary landowners who for thousands of years had exploited and oppressed them.  
The president would then give an order, and the accused would be brought before the 
tribunal.  The president then called upon people from the crowd, usually the trained 
peasants who had rehearsed their denunciation during the days leading up to the trial, 
to come up and denounce the accused.  Denouncers would arise, start pointing fingers 
at the accused, and denounce the accused with accusations and insults.  The 
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landowners, however, were not allowed to reply to the accusations or to defend 
themselves.  The denunciations would last from one day to three consecutive days or 
nights, depending on the crime being accused, with each day or night being reserved 
for a specific type of crime (economic crimes, moral crimes, and political crimes).  
However, denunciations are usually carried out at night to avoid being spotted by 
enemy troops.  A few days following the denunciation, a Special People’s Tribunal 
would come to the village to try those recently denounced by the peasants.  This 
tribunal, which was comprised entirely of poor and uneducated peasants who knew 
very little about judicial procedures, imposed sentences on the accused.  The sentences 
generally varied from the death penalty to hard labor and imprisonment, and generally 
included the confiscation of property.   
Once the phase of denouncing the landowning class ended, the Party had 
successfully removed rural Việt Nam’s most influential elements and had struck terror 
into the hearts of the entire rural population.  Consequently, the cadres began carrying 
out the government’s land policies of rent and interest rate reduction, rent refunds, 
collecting payment for unpaid labor, collecting taxes, and reforming the rural land 
ownership system by confiscating land from the landowning class and redistributing it 
to the poor and landless peasants.  They purged all the influential elements from the 
commune administrative organizations, reformed the organizations, and consolidated 
the commune’s political organizations.
In general, by rigorously instigating the process of mass mobilization, the Party 
differentiated the rural social classes and infused hatred of one class against another, 
to inspire the intense class struggle needed to uproot the foundation of rural society —
the landowner.  By masterminding the whole process, the Party treacherously decided 
to make a 180-degree turn against the very people that had helped sustain it.  Thus, 
poignantly, it confirmed that the root cause of social unrest and insurgency in rural 
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North Việt Nam was not raised from the bottom, but instead forcefully imposed from 
the top, regardless of the consequences.  Consequences were so tense and so strange 
that “fathers would run and hide at the sight of their children, and relatives would not 
dare to even look at each other’s faces when they met.”150
                                                
150 Nguyễn thị Soan.  Thanh Hoá Province, 05 Feb. 2009.
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CONCLUSION
Through looking at the formulation of the VWP’s land reform policies during 
the resistance period chronologically, between 1945 and 1953, this paper sought to 
bring to light the importance of these earlier years as the foundational phases of the 
implementation of the formal Land Reform program and the process of consolidating 
organizational power in rural North Việt Nam.  North Việt Nam was embroiled in a 
protracted resistance war against France, and its success was considered of paramount 
importance to the sustainability of the VWP’s ruling authority.  To be successful, the 
war effort required that a broad united front of all social groups be maintained to 
support it with two essential needs—the manpower to fight the war, and the 
production of agricultural surpluses necessary to feed the forces.  Thus, from 1945 to 
1949, the communists’ ‘land-to-the-tiller’ policy was initially limited to merely 
mitigating the peasant’s poor conditions, by means of rent and interest rate reductions, 
and temporary reallocation of lands belonging to French colonialists and Vietnamese 
traitors/collaborators.  Converging developments in 1948 and 1949 also placed a 
greater emphasis on the idea of investigating the rural areas, mobilizing the masses to 
reduce rents, and restructuring the rural administrative organizations.  Nevertheless, 
these policies were conservatively applied to appease the interests of both the rich and 
the poor, and thus did not yield much success in terms of redistributing lands to the 
poor.  However, once the political and military situation improved, the agrarian 
policies also began to take on a more forceful turn, as the four-year period from 1950 
to 1953 marked the most significant fundamental shift in the ICP’s agrarian 
policies. Influenced by changing international pressures and national conditions 
favoring the resistance, more extensive and insistent policies were developed and 
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implemented to set the theatrical stage for a class struggle, and the consolidation of 
Party power in rural North Việt Nam.   
The shift from uniting all social classes for the greater interests of the nation, to 
the destruction of this very unity to consolidate power, vividly exemplified the 
intentions and abilities of the VWP’s leaders to balance the objectives of winning the 
resistance and preparing the preconditions for instituting drastic social, economic, and 
political change.  It also epitomized the opportunistic character of the VWP when it 
decided to accept all ‘necessary evils’ in the process of building socialism.  The 
outcome was a deliberately orchestrated class antagonism that provoked widespread 
dismay, and affected the economic, political, sentimental, and ideological well-being 
and safety of every person in rural North Việt Nam at the time.  The ensuing 
consternation could be expressed as “sky-shaking and earth-shattering.”
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GLOSSARY
Vietnamese terms in the thesis
bắt rễ xâu chuỗi “Getting (growing) roots and stringing beads” (recruiting 
activists among the peasants, and then sending them out to 
recruit further activists themselves).
bộ The three geographical units into which Việt Nam was divided 
before 1954 (Bắc-bộ, Trung-bộ, and Nam-bộ)
cải cách ruộng đất Land reform.
chi bộ A base-level (usually village-level) branch of the Lao Workers’ 
Party.
chỉ tiêu Target.
chuỗi “Bead”—a peasant activist recruited by another peasant native 
to the village, not by an outside land-reform cadre.
công điền Public, communal land.
cốt cán “Backbone element”—a peasant chosen by the land reform 
cadres to become a village leader.  The cốt cán had usually been 
the rễ.
cụm A grouping of several đội within a land reform đoàn (brigade).
đảng The party—usually refer to the communist party.
đoàn “Brigade”—a brigade of land reform cadres was responsible for 
land reform in a considerable area, not necessary limited to a 
single province.
đội “Team”—one team of land reform cadres was responsible for 
one administrative village.
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huyện District—an administrative unit intermediate between the 
province and the administrative village.  
khu Zone—usually refers to a group of several provinces.
liên khu Interzone—a group of several provinces.
lúa chiêm 5th lunar month rice.
lúa mùa 10th lunar month rice.
nhân dân The people.
nông dân Tiller, peasant.
rễ “Root”—a peasant recruited as an activist by a land reform 
cadre.
sắc lệnh Decree.
tá điền Tenant; sharecropper.
thăm nghèo hỏi khổ To share poverty and inquire about sufferings.  Procedure used 
by land-reform cadres to get to know individual peasants.
thôn Hamlet.
tịch thu Confiscate.
tỉnh Province.
trung ương The center/central (government).
trưng mua Compulsory purchase.
trưng thu Requisition (confiscation without compensation)
trừng trị Punish.
ủy ban hành chánh Administrative committee.
xã Administrative village or commune.
xóm An administrative unit within the xã.
xử trí “To deal with,” in the sense of “to punish.”
xử tử To sentence to death.  
